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LAW, MINORITY, AND TRANSFORMATION: A
CRITIQUE AND RETHINKING OF CIVIL RIGHTS

DOCTRINES
Yousef T. Jabareen*
"The black revolution is much more than a struggle for the
rights of Negroes. It is forcing America to face all its
interrelated flaws-racism, poverty, and militarism. It is
exposing the evils that are rooted deeply in the whole
structure of our society. It reveals systematic rather than
superficial flaws and suggests that radical reconstruction
of society itself is the real issue to be faced."
-Martin Luther King, Jr., 19681
INTRODUCTION

Americans share a common history of formal, intercommunal subordination in which African Americans, forcibly
brought to the American continent as slaves, were treated as
legally inferior.2 This formal subordination, embodied by
slavery through the Jim Crow laws, was curtailed in the
modern era following the 1954 United States Supreme Court
3
decision of Brown v. Board of Education and its progeny.
* S.J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; human rights lawyer and adjunct
lecturer, American University Washington College of Law, Tel Aviv University
Law School, University of Haifa Law School, and the Academic College of Law.
I wish to express my gratitude to Professors Peter Edelman, Herman Schwartz,
Charles R. Lawrence III, Lama Abu Odeh, and Naomi Mezey for their guidance
and warm support. I also wish to thank Hadar Harris, George Naggiar, and
Enass Jabareen for taking the time to help; and the editors of the of the Santa
ClaraLaw Review for their thoughtful comments.
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 315 (James
Washington ed., 1986).
2. See generally JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM
SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (8th ed. 2000).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); see also RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
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The Brown decision suddenly turned a cultural heritage of
officially mandated racial discrimination into a social wrong.
Today, there is almost an American consensus that formal
racial discrimination falls outside the most commonly held
American values.
This article is devoted to a critical examination of the
African-American experience as a minority group that has
used legal strategies to promote equality in the United
States. Because the United States Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of American constitutional law,4 this article traces
landmark judicial developments in equal rights cases
involving African Americans.5 More specifically, this article
explores how modern judicial doctrines concerning equality
have dramatically emptied this principle of its promised
substance.
It observes that a systematic retreat by the
Supreme Court since the mid-1970s has essentially curtailed
the constitutional Equal Protection Doctrine's ability to bring
about meaningful advancement in African Americans' living
conditions, 7 while maintaining traditional societal privileges
and powers.
This article is divided into two key parts. Part I presents
the theoretical framework for the discussion in Part II. It
explores the main perspectives of two opposing civil rights
theories on equality: the transformative group-based theory
and the liberal individualist theory. Part I examines which
theory is more sensitive to issues of racial equality and
explores the different role that each theory suggests for both
the constitutional principle of equality and the judicial
branch. It also discusses the consequences each role may
have on the de facto reality of the minority group. This
discussion seeks to identify how to restore true equality in a
society with an undisputed history of discrimination against a
minority group.'
Following this theoretical discussion, Part II critically
explores the legal and social consequences of the African-

JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.

BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK

AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (rev. and expanded ed. 1976).
4. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803).

5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra Part II.
infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.
infra Parts II.B.2, II.C.
infra Part I.

2006]

LAW, MINORITY, AND TRANSFORMATION

515

American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The
discussion explores the emergence of the liberal individualist
doctrine within the judiciary through analysis of landmark
Supreme Court decisions, and subsequently demonstrates
how this doctrine has become the prevailing judicial approach
in addressing racial discrimination.9 Throughout, Part II
looks at the main critiques of scholars in response to Supreme
Court doctrine and demonstrates how the individualist
approach has been harmful to equal protection jurisprudence.
Responding to both specific Supreme Court cases and general
conceptions of race and equality, this article forms a
compelling, opposing doctrine based on the transformative
approach for inter-group equality.'
This article argues that the transformative approach is
the only effective way for minority groups to overcome the
established supremacy of the dominant group, achieving a
just and fair society."
This is not only a civil rights
discussion, but a human rights ideology.
The article
concludes that the transformative approach offers the only
hope for the long journey to realizing true human dignity and
freedom for all.' 2

I.

A TALE

OF TWO IDEOLOGIES

A. Introduction
Contemporary civil rights discourse in the United States
has revealed a growing tension between the liberal
3
individualist and transformative group-based theories
regarding how to best address racial discrimination and
racism. 4 The liberal individualist approach views the task of

9. See infra Part II; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN
LAW 131-270 (4th ed. 2000).

10.
11.
12.
13.

See discussion
See discussion
See discussion
See Charles

infra Part II.
infra Part I.E.
infra Part II.D.
R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the

Jurisprudenceof Transformation,47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 822 (1995) [hereinafter
Lawrence, The Jurisprudenceof Transformation].
14. Racial discrimination has been officially outlawed through U.S.
Supreme Court rulings, culminating with Brown and its progeny, as well as

through federal anti-discrimination statutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964. For the purposes of this paper, "anti-discrimination law" refers mainly to
federal constitutional law, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, defining the
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anti-discrimination law as passive, formal, and nonsubstantive. 5 Its purpose is merely to outlaw race-conscious
The
practices and neutralize their concrete effects. 16
views
antiapproach
group-based
transformative
and
discrimination law
as positive, transformative,
substantive. 7 Its purpose is to8 eradicate the subordinate
conditions of the minority group.'
As a result, the two theories differ in the roles they
The individualist approach
prescribe to the judiciary.
restricts the role of courts to merely eliminating particular,
The transformative
proscribed discriminatory actions.' 9
approach, on the other hand, expands the role by seeking to
enlist the institutional power of the judicial system to
transform society.2" In terms of rights, the former suggests
that the constitutional demand for equality secures only a
right to government neutrality with respect to race: it is the
right to be free of government consciousness of race. 2' The
later advocates a broader mandate for the project of equality

constitutional liability of states and public bodies for racially discriminatory
conduct, including what constitutes a violation and the scope of its remedy. The
Supreme Court is the final arbiter of what the law is, and it is supreme in the
exposition of the constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177-78 (1803).
15. Lawrence, The Jurisprudenceof Transformation,supra note 13, at 82225 & n.26; Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformationand Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1331, 1342 (1988); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1053-54 (1978).

16. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053-54; Lawrence, The Jurisprudence
of Transformation,supra note 13, at 822-24.
17. See Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1336, 1341; Freeman, supra note 15, at
1053; Angela P. Harris, Foreword:The Jurisprudenceof Reconstruction, 82 CAL.
L. REV. 741, 766-67 (1994); Lawrence, The Jurisprudence of Transformation,
supra note 13, at 824-25.
18. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053; Lawrence, The Jurisprudence of
Transformation, supra note 13, at 824-25.
19. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70, 89-92 (1995);
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1974).
20. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1341. See also Peter Charles Hoffer, "Blind
to History": The Use of History in Affirmative Action Suits: Another Look at City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 289-95 (1992); Charles R.
Lawrence III, Segregation "Misunderstood":The Milliken Decision Revisited, 12
U.S.F.L.R. 15, 48-54 (1977) [hereinafter Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood].
21. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1966); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188-93 (1964); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
305 (1879).
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that suggests an anti-subordination principle, as opposed to a
mere anti-discrimination principle.22 Under this view, the
right protected is a right to be free of the conditions of group
subordination.2 3
"Each
[theory]
defines
the
injury
of
[racial
discrimination] differently." 24 Individualists view the injury
inflicted by racial discrimination and racism as suffered by an
individual or a group of individuals. 5
In contrast,
transformativists view the injury as having been suffered by
society as a whole.26 Only fundamental societal change may
heal the injuries inflicted by the dominant group. Thus,
while individualists target current individual harms,
transformativists focus on remedying group-level injustices.
The main contentious perspectives of those two ideologies will
be discussed in the following three subsections.
B. Liberal IndividualistTheory
Liberal individualist theory advocates an ideology of
formal egalitarian norms. It insists that Equal Protection
rights created by the Constitution "'are, by its terms,
guaranteed to the individual"' and are established as
'"personal rights.' '28
The theory reiterates that the
Constitution commands equality by being "color-blind."29
22. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1377; Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 150-51, (1976); Freeman, supra note
15, at 1052-53.
23. Fiss, supra note 22, at 150-51; Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053.
24. Lawrence, The Jurisprudenceof Transformation,supra note 13, at 825.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See infra Part I.B-D. Although this discourse has developed in the
context of racial discrimination against African-Americans, I have tried to
frame it carefully within a universal language of race-based discrimination
exerted by a dominant majority against a disadvantaged minority.
28. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)) (striking down the
Richmond affirmative action plan that required the city's prime contractors to
subcontract at least thirty percent of their work to minority businesses); see also
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (striking down a
federal affirmative action program, emphasizing that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects "persons,not groups").
29. The term "color-blind" was first explicitly used by Justice Harlan in his
powerful dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: "Our Constitution is color-blind and
neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). However, Professor Aleinikoff,
among others, argues that Justice Harlan did not believe that racial
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Hence, protecting the individual citizen is the paramount
concern of equality. ° Under this approach, legal recognition
of group-based actions and identity politics undermine the
democratic principle of equal citizenship, mandating that
group affiliation be irrelevant to civic status. 31 Only this
group neutrality, as the argument goes, recognizes the unique
human individuality of a person and guarantees each citizen
the freedom of self-definition and the human dignity of selffulfillment.3 2 Furthermore, judging a person based on group
membership contradicts our humanness and inflicts injury on
each person by ignoring her individuality.3
Naturally, the colorblind approach rejects race preference
programs. It argues that all racial classifications are deeply
suspect and, therefore, subject to the highest judicial review
of "strict scrutiny,"3 4 whether intended to prejudice or benefit
the minority group. 5 This is so because racially classified

classifications are unconstitutional as such, and that he viewed segregation as

unconstitutional because it expressed white supremacy and African-American
inferiority. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent in
Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
961, 969 (1992).
30. See Adarand Constructors,515 U.S. at 227; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
31. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642-43 (1992); J. Harvie Wilkinson
III, The Law of Civil Rights and the Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural
America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993, 997-98 (1995); see generally THOMAS SOWELL,
CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984).

32. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-91
(1977); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003).
33. See Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47
STAN. L. REV. 855, 859 (1995) ("How can a group-based policy be reconciled with
the strong tradition of liberal individualism in American political thought?").
34. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("All legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect" and should be subjected to "the most rigid scrutiny").
Strict scrutiny requires that the racial classification be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling public interest. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
188 (1964) (overturning a conviction that only criminalized conduct by an
interracial couple, the Court stated such a racial classification "constitutionally
suspect," and "in most circumstances irrelevant" to any constitutionally
acceptable legislative purpose); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia
statutory prohibition of interracial marriage is unconstitutional). Yet, facially
neutral laws and policies that have a racially disparate impact must be proven
to have been adopted with intent to discriminate racially before they elicit strict
judicial scrutiny. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). See
generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 146-50 (1980).

35. See Adarand Constructors,515 U.S. at 228. In striking down a federal
affirmative action program, the Court stated that strict scrutiny should be
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programs designed to benefit members of a minority
constitute reverse discrimination against innocent members
of the majority. 6 Further, the colorblind approach views
societal discrimination as both "too amorphous"3 7 and an
basis for imposing
"insufficient and overexpansive"
affirmative action programs.38 It is concerned that these
programs "may only reinforce common stereotypes holding
that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection based on a factor having no relationship to
individual worth."39 Thus, preferential racial classifications
may "promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a
politics of racial hostility."4 °
The individualist approach acknowledges at the same
time that "genuine differences in ability," "private choices,"
and regular "economic forces" may perpetuate group
disparities in society-but in an egalitarian system these
applied whenever public bodies, at any level, employ race in their decisionmaking process. Id. at 228-29.
36. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986)
(invalidating a racially classified affirmative action plan imposed by the school's
board because it interfered with the school's seniority system to the detriment of
white workers). The Court described the plan as "discriminatory legal remedies
that work against innocent people." Id. at 276. But see Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713 (1993) (arguing that
"[wihites have come to expect and rely on [the privileges that accompany the
status of being white], and over time these expectations have been affirmed,
legitimated, and protected by the law"); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Sharing Space:
Why Racial Goodwill Isn't Enough, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1999) (arguing that
racial equality cannot be achieved unless whites give up the advantages they
hold over minorities).
37. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co, 488 U.S. 469, 497 (1989)
(invalidating Richmond's affirmative action program in the construction
industry despite Richmond's long history of discrimination against African
Americans). Justice O'Connor described the historical discrimination against
African Americans in the construction industry as an "amorphous" basis for
imposing affirmative remedies designed to benefit minority-owned businesses.
Id. at 499.
38. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (noting that "societal discrimination is
insufficient and overexpansive" as a basis for imposing affirmative action plan).
39. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1997) (plurality
ruling that a university admission policy that set aside sixteen percent of its
admissions seats for disadvantaged minorities violated the equal protection
rights of non-minority applicants).
40. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493. Accord Brest & Oshige, supra note 33, at 858
("Remedies based on race or ethnicity are in tension with the liberal ideals of
our society, they may encourage divisive identity politics, and they may
stigmatize and foster antagonism toward members of the groups they are
intended to benefit.").
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disparities have nothing to do with government actors.4 1
Therefore, remedies based on a group impact approach would
allocate benefits to individuals as group members, to which
they would otherwise not be entitled under the Constitution. 2
Furthermore, benefits for individual minorities would come at
the expense of "innocent people" who bear no responsibility
for the existing imbalance in conditions.4 '
Result-based
remedies and race-conscious policies are, as further stressed
by this view, political distortions of the law.' They have been
deemed by some as "political apartheid."4 5
Moreover, individualist theory views race-conscious
policies as a betrayal of the basic ideal of the civil rights
movement: namely, that race is irrelevant to public policies. 6
It argues that Brown v. Board of Education stands for the
principle that race is not "a relevant characteristic for public
decisionmaking at all."4 7
C. Transformative Group-Based Theory
Transformative theorists 48 argue that the individualist
41. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 n.2 (1991) (approving
the lower court's finding that the racial imbalance in Oklahoma City was due to
"private decision-making and economics").
42. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237-38 (1995)
(striking down a federal affirmative action plan, the Court ruled that the plan
might burden innocent non-minority businesses while at the same time
benefiting minority businesses that might not have suffered from
discrimination).
43. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (invalidating an affirmative action plan
imposed by the school board because it works against "innocent people"); see
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305; see generally Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 299-305 (1990).
44. SOWELL, supra note 31, at 119-20.
45. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) ("A... plan that
includes ... individuals who belong to the same race, but.., who may have
little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid."). Shaw struck down a
reapportionment plan that defined a majority African-American district in
North Carolina. Id.
46. SOWELL, supra note 31, at 109-10.
47. Wilkinson III, supra note 31, at 997-98 (1995). But see BELL, supra note
9, at 147 (arguing that "the central tenet of Brown, however, is not merely that
race is an irrelevant variable in most cases of government decision making,
rather it is that racial classifications, when used for the specific purpose of
subordinating individual members of a particular racial category, run counter to
the equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution.").
48. This discussion refers here mainly to the growing body of legal
scholarship known as "Critical Race Theory," which emerged in the American
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approach fails to foster meaningful racial equality largely
because it misunderstands the social construction of race in
society. 49 The individualist approach mistakenly addresses
race as if it were a synonym for the way one looks. 50 Instead,
race, according to the transformative view, "is much more
than a fact of superficial physiology. It is, instead, one of the
dominant characteristics that affects both the way the
individual looks at the world and the way the world looks at
the individual."5 ' Race "carries with it a complex social
meaning."5 2 In a society founded on formal racial exclusion,
race is constructed in a history and culture dominated by the

legal academy in the late 1970s. "Critical Race Theory embraces a movement of
left scholars, most of them scholars of color, situated in law schools, whose work
challenges the ways in which race and racial power are constructed and
represented in American legal culture and, more generally, in American society
as a whole." See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberl Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE KEY
WRITINGS]. For a discussion of historical, political and intellectual origins, see
id. at xiii-xxxii, and MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL
RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-15 (1993)
[hereinafter WORDS THAT WOUND].

Critical Race Theory may be situated as a

race-conscious intervention on the left of Critical Legal Studies. The latter is a
predominantly white academic organization established in the late seventies as
a left intervention against liberal legalist tradition that viewed law as an
objective mediator of social conflict. THE KEY WRITINGS, supra, at xvii-xix.
Critical Race Theory shares the Critical Legal Studies emphasis on how law,
while perhaps producing apparent victories in the short run, functions to
legitimize social oppression and is incompatible with a broader vision of social
change. Yet it has developed as a distinct scholarship mainly through
developing and incorporating a progressive critique of racial oppression into the
Critical Legal Studies analysis. The term "Critical Race Theory" reflects the
fact that this scholarship locates itself in the intersection of critical theory and
race, racism, and the law. Critical Race Theory's oppositional vision of racial
justice offered the alternative theoretical framework for the Supreme Court's
departure from its earlier, relatively progressive decisions during the civil
rights era toward a jurisprudence which not only condones, but rationalizes the
current systems of racial oppression. For a discussion on the relationship
between Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Studies, see THE KEY
WRITINGS, supra, at xvii-xxvii.

49. See generally Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional
Ghetto, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 627, 677-727 (1993).
50. Richard A. Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment:
An Approach to the Topics, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 581, 585 (1970).
51. Wasserstrom, supra note 50, at 585-86. See also Harris, supra note 17,
at 774 ("'Race' is real, and pervasive: our very perceptions of the world ... are
filtered through a screen of'race.'").
52. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1991).
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ideology of racial hierarchy. 3 Under this social construction,
there are "whole, complete, entitled human beings"---the
dominant majority group-and there are "others-the
excluded minority group-who are "fundamentally inferior
[and] less completely human."54 The deep-seated cultural
definitions of race are so pervasive that they cannot be
addressed today merely by prohibiting reference to them in
law and public policy.5 5
Transformative theory suggests, then, an alternative way
to think about racial equality: "This is to think of racial
equality as a substantive societal condition rather than as an
individual right."56 It views the eradication of perpetual
conditions of injustice and inequality as the paramount
concern. Consequently, "the disestablishment of ideologies
and systems of racial subordination" that produce these
conditions is seen by the transformative approach "as
indispensable and prerequisite to individual human dignity
and equality."5 7 In a society founded upon the maintenance of
racial discrimination, "the primary and fundamental goal of a
struggle for human dignity and equality must be the complete
transformation of ... society."5 s "The end of racial oppression
requires fundamental societal transformation, not just
adjustments within established hierarchies."5 9
53. Lawrence, The Jurisprudenceof Transformation,supra note 13, at 836.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 824.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 825. Professor Lawrence states:
Critical race theorists offer an alternative to the colorblind "just-don'ttalk-about-it" approach to race and racism. We name it and talk about
it; the more conversation the better. Rather than attempt to avoid
demeaning constructions of race by acting as if they don't exist, we call
for direct engagement with white supremacy in the battle over
meanings that define us and our place in the world. We choose to be
active combatants in the struggle over how to name and understand
our lived experience.
Giving names and meanings to our own lived experience is central to
transformative politics ....
Id. at 838-39.
59. Charles Lawrence III, Foreword: Who Are We? And Why Are We Here?
Doing Critical Race Theory in Hard Times, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY xi, xviii (Francisco Valdes, Jerome M. Culp and
Angela P. Harris eds., 2002). Eliminating racial oppression is viewed by
Critical Race Theory as "part of the broader goal of ending all forms of

2006]

LAW, MINORITY, AND TRANSFORMATION

523

Transformative theory presumes that "racism has
contributed to all contemporary manifestations of group
advantage and disadvantage along racial lines, including
differences in income, imprisonment, health, housing,
education, political representation, and military service."" It
presents "racism not as insolated instances of conscious
bigoted decisionmaking or prejudiced practice, but as larger,
systemic, structural, and cultural, as deeply psychologically
and socially ingrained."6 1 Race is "a political reality. 6 2 Thus
understood, it becomes "a tool of resistance"6 3 against the
racially demeaning cultural meaning and social construction
of both overt and covert racism.'
Consequently, transformative theory advocates a positive
remedial approach to racial discrimination. Efforts to change
the situation through identity politics, including affirmative
action programs, are required to remedy the conditions of
racial subordination. 65 Under this view, there can be no
symmetry between racial classifications that foster the
subordination of disadvantaged groups and those designed to
remedy the effects of historical subordination.66 Taking race
into account for good and important reasons is compatible
with the constitutional mandate of equality.6 7 Accordingly,
the task of anti-discrimination law is to carry out this societal
transformation.

oppression." See WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 48, at 6.
60. WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 48, at 6.
61. WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 48, at 5.
62. Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 721.
63. Harris, supra note 17, at 774.
64. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355-381
(1987) [hereinafter Lawrence III, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism]
(thoroughly explaining the ways unconscious racism operates to demean and
subordinate African Americans).
65. For a thoughtful discussion of affirmative action, see generally CHARLES
LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON'T Go BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1997).
66. BELL, supra note 9, at 145-47.
67. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, First Class, in OWEN FISS, A COMMUNITY
OF EQUALS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF NEW AMERICANS 30 (Joshua
Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) [hereinafter A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS]
(arguing that a group-based approach offers an explanation as to why racial
classification policies, such as affirmative action programs to enhance

subordinated groups, ought to be judged by different constitutional standards
than racial classification policies that prejudice subordinated groups).
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D. ConflictingAspects of Individualistand Transformative
Approaches
1. Unconscious Racism v. IntentionalDiscrimination
Central to the individualist approach is the concept of
explicit intent.68 Under this concept, decisions and practices
of racial discrimination are only those adopted with the raceconscious intent to discriminate.6 9 Such intent might be
inferred either from a direct reference to race, facial
classification, 0 or from a showing of a discriminatory purpose
that underlies facially neutral actions.7 1 Accordingly, facially
neutral decisions and practices that happen to burden
minorities disproportionately are not deemed to be racially
discriminatory unless proven to have originated with a
conscious objective of adversely affecting a particular racial
group.72 Strict judicial review is warranted only when such
intentional discrimination is established, 3 regardless of
whether the classifications are designed to harm minorities or
benefit them.74
68. See BELL, supra note 9, at 137.
69. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1985) ("Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause." (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265 (1977)); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) ("[Tlhe
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately
be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
70. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967) (Virginia statute
prevented marriage between persons based only on racial classifications);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (Florida statute treated "the
interracial couple made up of a white person and a Negro differently than it
does any other couple").
71. See, e.g., Hunter, 471 U.S. at 223 (invalidating a provision in the
Alabama Constitution that was racially neutral on its face because it was
proved that it was enacted with the purpose of discriminating against African
Americans).
72. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
73. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
269-70 (1977) (the Court found no constitutional liability under the equal
protection clause because the petitioners failed to prove that the zoning decision
was consciously undertaken with the purpose of excluding African Americans).
74. As Justice Scalia put it, "government can never have a 'compelling
interest' in discriminating on the basis of race in order to 'make up' for past
racial discrimination in the opposite direction." Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)). He
continued, "[Ulnder our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or debtor race." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Proponents of the transformative approach respond that
requiring explicit intent is not only ineffective in changing the
real-life inequalities suffered by minorities, but in fact
perpetuates these inequalities.7 5 They explain that overt
racial bias in present society is rare because it is no longer
socially acceptable,7 6 but the racist social messages remain.
The myths and stereotypes that produced overt, racist
manifestations continue to play a dominant role in society,
although in subtle and sometimes unconscious ways.7 7
The racist myths and stereotypes have been internalized
by society and continue to interfere with thoughts, ideas, and
beliefs.7" As a result, while decisions and practices might be
undertaken without clear race-conscious intent, they are
nonetheless influenced and directed by these myths and
stereotypes. 79 This culturally ingrained, unconscious racism
hurts minorities today no less than conscious racial
discrimination and, therefore, must also be legally
recognized.8 0
Instead of relying exclusively on the intent principle,
transformative
theorists explore the broader social
construction of facially neutral decisions and practices that
have a disproportionate adverse effect on minorities.8 ' They

75. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953, 969 (1993) (arguing that "retaining the intent requirement in the face of its
demonstrated failure to effectuate substantive racial justice is indicative of a
complacency concerning, or even a commitment to, the racial status quo that
can only be enjoyed by those who are its beneficiaries-by white people").
76. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, The New Racism: Racial Structure in the
United States, 1960s-1990s, in RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE
UNITED STATES: TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 55, 60 (Paul Wong ed.,
1999).

77. Unconscious racism and subtler forms of race-consciousness are the
focus of Professor Lawrence's seminal work The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64. Professor
Lawrence thoroughly explains how unconscious racial motivation influences a
large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination. Id. at 328-44.
78. Id. at 339-44.
79. See Flagg, supra note 75, at 957 (arguing that unconscious race-specific
decision-making in the American society is so common that it is, in fact, the
norm for white decision-makers).
80. Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at 355
(arguing that the "equal protection doctrine must address the unconscious
racism that underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of
governmental policy").
81. BELL, supra note 9, at 137-44.

526

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol: 46

argue that unconscious racism underlies many of these
practices and policies, 2 and should therefore also be subject,
at the very least, to strict judicial review whenever they carry
83
demeaning cultural meanings for minorities.
2. Material Subordinationv. Symbolic Subordination
Because the individualist approach requires proof of
explicit intent, its goal might be seen as merely the
eradication
of "symbolic subordination" suffered by
minorities, namely, the formal denial of social and political
equality to all members of the minority group regardless of
their accomplishments.84 Such subordination reinforces a
group hierarchical ideology that minority members are
inferior to the majority and are therefore excluded from the
vision of society as a "community of equals."8 5 Formal racial
classifications operate as symbols that demean and
stigmatize the individual in the eyes of society by judging him
in accordance with the inferior status of his group, instead of
in accordance with his individuality.8 6 The legal task under
82. Lawrence, Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, supra note 64, at 355.
83. Id. at 355-56 (arguing that instead of relying exclusively on the intent of
the government decision-makers in applying judicial strict scrutiny, all facially
neutral laws and practices that carry racially demeaning cultural meanings
should be subject to strict scrutiny). One author argues for a "group antisubjugation" approach for the Equal Protection Clause. Fiss, supra note 22, at
150. This approach sees the correction of group disadvantages as the central
theme of judicial intervention under equal protection. Id. Because the harm to
the disadvantaged group is done on a group basis, group-based remedies are
required. Id. Disadvantaged racial or ethnic groups, according to this theory,
have group rights to distributive and compensatory justice. Id.
84. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1377.
85. Id.
86. See Paul Brest, In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 8 (1976). "Racial stigma" is often cited as the principal substantive
harm against which the Equal Protection Clause is directed. Lawrence, supra
note 64, at 349-50. Under this racial stigma theory, the chief objective of
judicial strict scrutiny is to target governmental actions that operate to
"degrade a class of persons by labeling it as inferior." Id. at 350 (citing Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 361-62 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The label of inferiority generated by
formal subordination demeans the p~rsonal wealth of the individual and
degrades him in the eyes of the society, establishing a societal barrier that
excludes him from the society's benefits and opportunities.
Id.
Early
expression of this theory might be found in Justice Strong's opinion in Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), in which he struck down a West Virginia
statute that excluded African Americans from serving on a jury. Writing for the
Court, Justice Strong explained that the equal protection clause protects
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the individualist view is to remove the formal barriers and
symbolic manifestations of subordination, such as "White
Only" signs, and to achieve a system of neutral norms and
formal inclusion.
In contrast, the transformative approach focuses on the
lasting "material subordination" suffered by the minority, not
just on the symbolic one.88 Material subordination refers to
the ways in which discrimination and exclusion economically
subordinate minority groups to the majority.89 Eradication of
symbolic subordination is a decidedly progressive moment in
the political and social life of minority groups, but it should
not be the end of the story. It must be a starting point toward
transforming
real-life
conditions
and
eliminating
socioeconomic subordination.9 °
3. Victim Perspective v. PerpetratorPerspective
The transformative view approaches the concept of racial
discrimination from the "victim perspective." 91 From the
African Americans "from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society," and that excluding African Americans from juries was "an assertion of
their inferiority." Id. at 308. Similarly, in his powerful sole dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, Justice Harlan noted that segregation in public accommodation
proceeded "on the ground that colored citizens are . . . inferior and degraded."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Brown's
unanimous decision might also be seen as based on targeting this stigma by
invalidating segregated public schools that, in Chief Justice Warren's language,
"generate U a feeling of inferiority" as to the status of African Americans in the
community. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
Professor
Lawrence argues that racial stigma theory focuses on the harm racial
classification poses to the individual.
Lawrence, The Jurisprudence of
Transformation,supra note 13, at 824 n.23.
87. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1378. See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 191 (1964) ("[Tlhe central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the
States.").
88. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1377. See also Hayman & Levit, supranote
49, at 677-86 (discussing disparities in economic status, health, and educational
opportunities between America's white and black citizens).
89. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1377 ("This subordination occurs when
Blacks are paid less for the same work, when segregation limits access to decent
housing, and where poverty, anxiety, poor health care, and crime create a life
expectancy for Blacks that is five to six years shorter than for whites.").
90. For a profound treatment of the socioeconomic stratification of African
Americans, see Hayman, & Levit, supra note 49, at 677-709.
91. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 1052-53 (demonstrating how the concept
of racial discrimination may be approached from the perspective of either its
victim or its perpetrators, and arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court has largely
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victim's perspective, 92 "racial discrimination describes those
conditions of actual social existence as a member of a
perpetual underclass."9 3 The victim's perspective "includes
both the objective conditions of life-lack of jobs, lack of
money, or housing-and the consciousness associated with
those objective conditions-lack of choice and lack of human
individuality in being forever perceived as a member of a
group rather than as an individual."9 4 This perspective
suggests that the problem of racial discrimination "will not be
solved until the conditions associated with it have been
eliminated." 95
Conversely, the individualist view approaches racial
discrimination from the "perpetrator perspective."96 This
perspective "sees the racial discrimination not as conditions
but as actions, or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by
the perpetrator."9 7 It focuses more "on what particular
perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than it is
on the overall life situation of the victim class."9"
Consequently, proponents of the individualist theory argue
that the problem of racial discrimination would be solved by
neutralizing the bad acts of the perpetrator. 99
Two integral parts to the perpetrator perspective are the

remained within the perpetrator perspective).
Freeman explains that in the context of racial
92. Id. at 1052.
discrimination "victim" means:
a current member of the group that was historically victimized by
actual perpetrators or a class of perpetrators. Victims are people who
continue to experience life as a member of that group and continue to
experience conditions that are actually or are ostensibly tied to the
historical experience of actual oppression or victimization, whether or
not individual perpetrators, or their specific successors in interest, can
be identified now. The victim perspective is intended to describe the
expectations of an actual human being who is a current member of the
historical victim class-expectations created by an official change of
Those
moral stance toward members of the victim group.
expectations ...

include changes in condition.

Id. at 1053 n.16.
93. Id. at 1052.
94. Id. at 1052-53.
95. Id. at 1053. "Among such conditions might be that one race seems to
have a hugely disproportionate share of the worst houses, the most demeaning
jobs, and the least control over societal resources." Id. at 1075.
96. Id. at 1052.
97. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053.
98. Id.
99. Brest, supra note 86, at 49-52.
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principles of "fault" and "causation. " 10 The "fault" principle
attributes exclusively the origin of the racial discrimination to
a blameworthy individual perpetrator who takes action with
a purpose to discriminate.'0 ' Under this principle, racial
equality will be achieved merely by separating "from the
masses of society those blameworthy individuals who are
10 2
The idea of "fault"
violating the otherwise shared norm."
draws the line between "those blameworthy individuals" and
the "innocent" masses "who need not feel any personal
responsibility
for
the
conditions
associated
with
discrimination.' 0 3
Under the "causation" principle, conditions of racial
discrimination are merely those particular conditions
"produced by and mechanically linked to the behavior of an
identified blameworthy perpetrator. " 104
This principle
distinguishes between "those discriminatory conditions" and
other resulting conditions that are "mere accidents, or caused,
if at all, by the behavior of ancestral demons whose
responsibility cannot follow their successors in interest over
time.' 0 5
Transformativists, on the other hand, focus more on the
"overall life situation of the victim class" than on what
"particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some
victims."0 6 They argue that transforming the conditions of
the victim class is the responsibility of the entire society and
"will make us all more fully human."0 7
4.

Equality as a Result v. Equality as a Process
The differences between the perpetrator and victim
perspectives
represent
how
individualists
and
100. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1054.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1054-55.
103. See id. at 1054. For a critique of this notion, see Robert T. Hayman, Recognizing Inequality: Rebellion, Redemption and the Struggle for Transcendence
in the Equal Protectionof the Law, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 9, 56-57 (1991).
104. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1056.
105. Id. See also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) ("[It must be
shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state or local school districts, or of
a single school district have been a substantial cause of interdistrict
segregation." (emphasis added)). For a critique of "causation," see Hayman,
supra note 103, at 34 n.91.
106. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053.
107. Lawrence, The Jurisprudenceof Transformation,supra note 13, at 846.
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transformativists view the legal mandate of equality: the
former promotes equality as a process and the latter promotes
equality as a result."' 8 The view of equality as a process
advocates a neutral governmental decision-making process
that is divorced of any group-based classification. 10 9 The view
of equality as a result argues that equality and human
dignity cannot be realized without a comprehensive
transformation of the real-life experiences and conditions of
disadvantaged minority groups.1
5. StructuralInequality v. Meritocracy
The individualist approach maintains that the current
plight of minority groups in a "colorblind" society is the result
of merit-based competition in a free market.'
It asserts that
society is a meritocracy, and the fact that minorities live
typically in a lower socio-economic rung is justified by the
natural shape of social and economic forces." 2 Under this
theory, minority conditions are "matters of fate" that have
nothing to do with racial bias."
Furthermore, societal
disparities might be attributable to the genetic inferiority of
14
racial minorities or a "culture of poverty.""

108. See BELL, supra note 9,at 136.
109. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10
(1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (suggesting race-neutral alternatives to
Richmond's race-based affirmative action plan). For a critique of Justice
O'Connor's suggestion, see BELL, supra note 9, at 152-54.
110. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 150-51; see also Owen Fiss, The Immigrant as
Pariah, in A COMMUNITY OF EQUALS, supra note 67, at 12 (arguing that the
constitutional demand for equality "prohibits not only discrimination, but
also ... [the creation of] socially and economically disadvantaged groups that
are forced to live at the margin of society").
111. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 501-02 (noting that for purposes of
demonstrating discriminatory exclusion "where special qualifications are
necessary," the relevant statistics must be "the number of minorities qualified
to undertake the particular task").
112. See Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 n.2 (1991) (noting that the
racial imbalance in the Oklahoma City school system was due to "private
decision-making and economics").
113. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 1054.
114. See SOWELL, supra note 31, at 42-47; Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1379
(arguing in this context that the "rationalizations once used to legitimate Black
subordination based on a belief in racial inferiority have now been reemployed
to legitimate the domination of Blacks through reference to an assumed cultural
inferiority"). Cf. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 269-315
(1994) (arguing that educational disparities between African Americans and
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In a colorblind society, societal disparities that correlate
with race are grounded on the individual's insufficient merit
and qualifications. 115 Moreover, a group-based approach does
not account for genuine differences in ability 1 6 and
contradicts the traditional American ideal of self-reliance.
In contrast, transformativists assert that current
disparities and social practices are the result of historically
oppressive, formal practices and that the colorblind approach
disregards this history of discrimination." 7 They stress that
the individualist approach incorrectly "presupposes a world
composed of atomistic individuals whose actions are outside
of and apart from the social fabric and without historical
continuity."" 8
They further criticize the individualist
approach for declaring racial classifications irrelevant and, at
the same time, blocking any affirmative steps toward
realizing real-life conditions where race is truly irrelevant. 1 9
The transformative approach therefore advocates that the
material plight of minority members be viewed in the context
120
of their historical exclusion.

European Americans reflect genetically and environmentally influenced
differences in cognitive ability).
115. In Croson, the majority opinion suggests that huge racial disparities in
business contracts might have been the result of natural factors such as a
preference by minorities for jobs in lower-paying industries. Croson, 488 U.S. at
503.
116. See SOWELL, supra note 31, at 37-48.
117. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 721 ("In rejecting... the social
constructions of race . . . the Court proffers a view that is contradicted by
history, inconsistent with the empirical data, refuted by virtually every social
science and natural science theorist, and embarrassed by the experience of
every American.").
118. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1054. See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A
Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1087 (1991) ("White
racism has made 'blackness' a relevant category in our society.
Yet
colorblindness seeks to deny the continued social significance of the category, to
tell blacks that they are no different from whites, even though blacks as blacks
are persistently made to feel that difference.").
119. See Kenneth Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural
Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 343 (1986) ("To shift from a system of group
discrimination to a system of individual performance is to perpetuate the effects
of past discrimination into the present and future.").
120. See Hoffer, supra note 20, at 289-95 (critiquing the Croson majority's
failure to recognize the historical discrimination suffered by African Americans
in Richmond).
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6. Legitimization and Rationalization
Transformativists argue that the individualist approach
does not rightly address the goal of equality, but actually
creates myths that justify the status quo of inequality and
legitimizes current conditions of subordination.12 1 They stress
that the individualist theory creates an illusion that racism
and negative stereotypes associated with minority groups are
no longer the primary factor responsible for the condition of
the minority.'2 2 In fact, majority supremacist norms do not
disappear in colorblind systems; they only "submerge[U in
popular consciousness" and persist in unspoken form as an
objective standard for excellence.' 2 3
The meanings and
consequences of this norm are determined exclusively by
those who have the power to do so. 24 Thus, the majority
norm serves to legitimatize the continuing domination of
25
those who "fail" to meet it.
Transformativists
assert that individualist theory
provides an ideological framework that makes the current
conditions facing disadvantaged groups appear fair and
reasonable. 1 26 This rationalization makes it difficult for the
majority to recognize adverse effects on minorities as
illegitimate or avoidable. This rationalizes whatever degree
of economic and social distance
may have been attained at the
27
minority.
the
of
expense

121. See Gotanda, supra note 52, at 53-63 (arguing that a colorblind
constitutionalism serves to legitimate, and thereby perpetuate, the social,
economic, and political privileges that whites have been holding over minorities
in America).
122. Id. at 18-19.
123. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1379.
124. Indeed, the transformative approach seeks to gain equal access for
disadvantaged minorities to the "power of the intelligentsia to construct
knowledge, social meaning, ideology, and definitions" of these norms. See
WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 48, at 14.

125. See Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at
369-79 (critiquing the civil service exam employed for hiring purposes in
Washington v. Davis).
126. This is done by appropriating the traditional conception of law as
rational, objective, neutral, and determinate. Once the conditions are declared
by law as legal and legitimate, they are officially declared as divorced from
politics, the latter traditionally seen as subjective, discretionary, and openended. See SOWELL, supra note 31, at 119-20; Mark Tushnet, An Essay on
Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1363-64 (1984) (critiquing formal legal rights
discourse).
127. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1380-81; Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel,
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7. Denial and Blaming the Victim
The transformative view contends that the cost of
viewing racial discrimination narrowly goes far beyond the
legal debate. The individualist approach "helps spread the
epidemic of denial" by seizing the liberal rhetoric of
individuality and colorblindness.1 28 It further "enables those
in power to blame the victim while assuring themselves and
each other that they are free from any fault."12 9
Individualist rhetoric serves both to rationalize the selfinterested practices of the majority group and to make these
practices appear credible to minority groups. 130 Accordingly,
if minority members are being treated "equally," yet they
remain at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder, then they
can blame no one but themselves for their situation. 131 In
turn, this rationalization produces a negative psychological
impact reflected in self-blame and other self-destructive
attitudes on the part of minority members who have
not made
1 32
it within a supposed system of "equal opportunity."
8. Collectivity and Organization
Transformativists further argue that the individualist
approach undermines the collectivity among the minority
group and is politically damaging. 33 The mere eradication of
formal barriers creates new life opportunities only for

The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or AntiSubordination?,
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003) (demonstrating how the colorblind approach has
functioned to rationalize social stratification).
128. Lawrence, The Jurisprudence of Transformation, supra note 13, at 837;
Gotanda, supra note 52, at 16-24.
129. Richard Delgado, Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1389, 1396 (1991) (reviewing ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING THE AMERICAN RACE

PROBLEM (1990)).
130. See Mark Tushnet, supra note 126, at 1363-64 (critiquing the role of
legal rights discourse in rationalizing an oppressive and unjust societal order,
and arguing that legal rights discourse impedes advances by progressive social
forces as people's ideas and thoughts for progress become trapped within the
narrow ideological framework of the law at the expense of pursuing real
demands and objectives); see generally THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE

CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
131. Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at 325.
132. Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1383.
133. Id. at 1383 n.197 (referring to "collectivity" as "the recognition of
common interests and the benefits derived by Blacks of all classes in sharing
the burdens of social struggle," and stressing that "[t]he potential for collective
struggle is maximized where the grievance is shared by all").
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selected members of the minority group that are not shared
by the majority of other members. 3 4 This process creates
social and economic distance among the various classes
within the group and, consequently, may impede communal
efforts to unite behind issues. 13 This intra-group distancing
may create doubt among some members of the group-mainly
those who have benefited the most from the formal
inclusion-as to "whether there is enough similarity between
their life experiences and those of other [minority members]
to warrant collective political action."1 36 In other words, the
semblance of neutral norms obscures and diffuses the targets
of the minority group and thus may undermine efforts to
organize collectively.
E.

PartI Conclusion

As the above critique shows, transformative group-based
ideology provides a more compelling remedy than the
individualist colorblind doctrine. It does so by requiring a
constant effort to achieve racially balanced educational,
social, economic, and political systems. The transformative
approach views past formal inequality as the basis for its
broader understanding of equality. Namely, that the past
continues to have pernicious effects on society today and,
without eradicating these effects, no meaningful equality can
be achieved. A comprehensive remedial power should be
invoked to address the real-life conditions of inequality
experienced by minority members. Race conscious policies,
including wide-ranging affirmative action programs, are
integral to this remedy, leading toward real societal
transformation.

II. AFRICAN AMERICANS: BETWEEN FORMAL EQUALITY AND
SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY

A. Introduction
This part demonstrates that the U.S. Supreme Court has
embraced, on the doctrinal level, the strict individualist
approach when addressing equal protection cases to the
134. Id. at 1383.
135. Id. at 1384.
136. Id.
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detriment of the struggle for social change by African
Americans. 3 7 On a practical level, this has resulted in a wide
socio-economic gap between African Americans and European
Americans. Over half a century after Brown v. Board of
Education, African Americans are still disproportionately
represented at the bottom of the American socio-economic
ladder.
As the following illustrates, it is a matter of deep
frustration, to say the least, that the passionate critiques of
transformative theorists were not adopted and reinforced.
Indeed, when it became clear that meaningful integration
after Brown could not be achieved without curtailing
European Americans privileges, the road to true inclusion
was blocked. It is precisely at this stage that race-conscious
policies, indispensable to achieving substantive equality, were
attacked under the pretext that group-based policies
contradict the traditional American values of liberalism,
individualism, and merit.
Roughly a century and a half ago during the
Reconstruction era (1865-1872), the principle of equality was
introduced into American judicial discourse
as a
constitutional principle. 13 8 Along with the abolition of slavery
through the Thirteenth Amendment 139 and the Fifteenth
Amendment's guarantee of the elective franchise, 40 the
Fourteenth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[n]o
state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."14 ' The constitutional principle of
equal protection was one of the greatest legacies of
Reconstruction. Its underlying promise was to make African
Americans full and equal citizens after centuries of slavery.'4 2
Yet, the hope of the Fourteenth Amendment was
137. This approach was significantly supported, if not dictated, by
conservative constitutional scholars as well as by politicians and policy makers.
BELL, supra note 9, at 133-36.
138. See generally CELESTE M. CONDIT & JOHN L. LUCAITES, CRAFTING
EQUALITY, AMERICA'S ANGLO-AFRICAN WORD (1993) (studying and critiquing

the meaning of the word "equality" in American public discourse).
139. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
141. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
142. KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 51-56 (1989).
See
generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 (1988); W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA

(Russell & Russell 1963) (1935).
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contradicted by the harsh regime of the Jim Crow lawsracial segregation laws governing the relationship between
blacks and whites in the post-Reconstruction era.'
Authorized by federal and state governments, racial
segregation and discrimination prevailed in public schools,
libraries, public accommodations, workplaces, parks, drinking
and
elsewhere.'"
fountains,
restrooms,
cemeteries,
Segregation excluded blacks from the national mainstream on
the ground that they were so inferior that they could not be
45
allowed to associate with whites.'
In Plessy v. Ferguson,46 the Supreme Court sanctioned
this policy of racial segregation. 147 It reasoned that while
were
separate,
they
were
public
accommodations
constitutionally equal. 48 In establishing the "separate but
equal" doctrine, the Court stated that segregation reflected
the "established usages, customs and traditions of the
people."' 4 9 Hence, African Americans were legally excludable
from mainstream American society in all areas of public life.
public
This
was
realized
through
sub-standard
institutions, employment
accommodations,
educational
options, and housing opportunities. 50 Segregation was not
meaningless racial separation, but rather an implied racial

143. KARST, supra note 142, at 64-69. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed. 1966).

For example,
144. See generally FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 2.
Tennessee's 1901 law prohibiting co-education of the white and colored races is
one example of a Jim Crow law in education. H.B. 7, 1901 Leg., ch. 7 (Tenn.
1901). Section 1 of the Act provided that "it shall be unlawful for any school,
academy, college or other place of learning to allow white and colored persons to
attend the same school, academy, college or other place of learning." Id. § 1.
Offenders of this act were subject to fines and imprisonment up to six months.
Id. § 3.
145. Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood,supra note 20, at 23-26.
146. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (Homer Plessy, being "seven
eighths Caucasian and one eighth African blood," was prohibited from boarding
a Louisiana railway car reserved by law for white travelers).
147. The Court rejected the idea that a legal racial distinction "stamps the
colored race with a badge of inferiority." Id. at 551-52.
148. The Court upheld a Louisiana law requiring public places to serve
African Americans in separate, but ostensibly equal, accommodations. Id.
149. Id. at 550-51.
150. Id. (stating that there is no constitutional remedy if "one race be inferior
to the other socially"). See also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., SHADES OF
FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITICS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL

PROCESS 108-13 (1996) (discussing more broadly the notion of racial inferiority
and the majority decision in Plessy).
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hierarchy establishing African Americans as inferior to
15 1
whites.
Out of the harsh Jim Crow reality of politically and
judicially sanctioned exclusion emerged America's civil rights
protests in the 1950s and 1960s. 15 2 Using nonviolent tactics,
organized masses of civil rights activists directly confronted
and effectively disrupted the normal functioning of
institutions responsible for their subjugation. 5 3 The mass
protests were entwined with pivotal legal battles to advance
the cause of equal rights and opportunities.5
While the
former were fought in the streets, the latter were fought in
the courts.
B. State Actions that Harm
1.

Brown v. Board of Education

Challenging the separate-but-equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson was at the center of African-American legal efforts.
Attacks initially focused on the equality part of the separatebut-equal doctrine, acknowledging that neither white
America nor the judiciary were prepared for immediate direct

151. Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood, supra note 20, at 25 ("The
institution of segregation and the injury it inflicts on blacks are necessarily
misunderstood until one recognizes that its chief purpose is to define, not to
separate.").
152. It is beyond the scope of this project to provide detailed accounts of all
the struggles of America's civil rights movement. For a detailed description of
key events in this struggle, see generally, e.g., CLAYBORNE CARSON, IN
STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S (3d ed. 1981);
ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE (1984); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE
STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY 1954-1992 (rev. ed. 1993); JUAN WILLIAMS,
EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 1954-1965 (1987).
153. BELL, supra note 9, at 653-718. See generally JOHN J. ANSHBRO,
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.-NONVIOLENT STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR SOCIAL
CHANGE 231-265 (1982).
154. See ROY L. BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION-CASES AND
PERSPECTIVES 48-68 (2d ed. 2000). The legal struggle was led chiefly by the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which
was founded in the beginning of the 1900s. The NAACP became the most
dominant organization in the legal struggle against segregation, mainly by
pursuing legal challenges and litigation in the courts. See generally MARK V.
TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION
1925-1950 (1987) (discussing the NAACP legal approach to combat educational
segregation).
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Successful challenges
attacks on the doctrine itself.'55
addressed situations in which segregated educational
facilities were not equal or where there was no education at
all available for African Americans. 5 6 These legal attacks on
segregation initially focused on higher education, including
law schools. The NAACP litigated and won a series of crucial
Supreme Court cases, gradually paving the way for a direct
attack on the separate-but-equal doctrine.' 57
The NAACP's efforts culminated in the unanimous
Brown v. Board of Education decision by the Supreme
Court. 5 ' Brown declared school segregation to be an
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteen Amendment because it was "inherently
59
unequal."
Separation of the races, the Court reasoned,
"generates a feeling of inferiority" as to the AfricanAmericans' status in the community "that may affect their
155. BELL, supra note 9, at 443-46.

156. The initial focus was to force an equalization of public school
expenditures, as there was documented substantial racial inequality in perpupil expenditures, school conditions, and teacher salaries, mainly throughout
the south. See, e.g., Alston v. Sch. Bd., 112 F.2d 992, 997 (4th Cir. 1940)
(holding that African-American teachers were illegally paid less than white
teachers for the same public services).
157. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (holding
that the state discriminated against African Americans by not offering them an
in-state opportunity for legal education, and ordering the admission of an
African-American student to the state's all-white law school). Gaines was the
NAACP's first major federal victory in an education case and it was the
beginning of the NAACP's efforts to chip away at the separate-but-equal
doctrine. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 154, at 50. See also Sipuel v. Bd. of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948) (reaffirming Gaines and holding that the
State must offer the plaintiff an equal legal education); McLaurin v. Okla. State
Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 640-42 (1950) (holding that an AfricanAmerican doctoral candidate was denied equal protection as African-American
students were required to sit, eat, and study in segregated areas within the
school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950) (holding that a hastily
established law school for African Americans was unequal in physical facilities
and "reputation of the faculty" and ordering the plaintiff admitted to the
University of Texas Law School). These victories made the separate-but-equal
doctrine a hugely expensive arrangement because it was almost impossible
financially to provide true equality in both tangible and intangible aspects.
BROOKS ET AL., supra note 154, at 65-68. As a result, economic pressure was
added to the moral failure of the separate-but-equal doctrine. For further
discussion of the graduate school cases, see JACK GREENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONAL
LITIGATION 49-89 (1977).
158. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 US 483 (1954).
159. Id. at 495.
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hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." 60
Rejecting Plessy's social inferiority premise, Brown sparked
mass legal and popular efforts to dismantle segregation in
162
education, 16 1 and other areas of public life.
A decade later, Brown's ruling was translated into
federal civil rights legislation prohibiting discrimination in
education, employment, housing, and public accommodations.
The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964163 marked one
of the most remarkable legal accomplishments of its era. The
Civil Rights Act was passed in an effort to deal with racial
discrimination and hostile societal attitudes toward African
Americans that continued to infect American society. 1 64 For

160. Id. at 494. For a leftist critique of Brown's sole focus upon the effects of
school segregation, see Lawrence, SegregationMisunderstood, supra note 20, at
43 ("Instead of taking judicial cognizance of the fact that the manifest purpose
of segregation was to designate blacks as inferior and noting that such a
purpose was constitutionally impermissible, the Court chose to focus upon the
effect of school segregation."). For a controversial critique of the Brown
decision, see Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959), in which Wechsler argues that Brown lacked a
basis in neutral principles because it ignores the constitutional liberties of
whites to choose their associations. He explains that "if the freedom of
association is denied by segregation, integration forces an association upon
those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant." Id. at 34. According to his
analysis, the legal issue in legally sanctioned segregation was not one of
discrimination at all. Id. Assuming facilities were equal, he explains, the legal
issue was "the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be involved." Id.
For a critique of Wechsler's argument, see Charles Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 425-26 (1960) (concluding that
racial equality was the correct principle to underlay the Brown ruling and that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly bars racial
segregation that harms African Americans and benefits whites).
161. See generally BELL, supra note 9, at 215-17; Alexander M. Bickel, The
Decade of School Desegregation:Progressand Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193
(1964).

162. The Court relied on Brown to decide a number of desegregation rulings.
See, e.g., Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (city auditoria); New Orleans
City Park Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352
U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (city golf
courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches).
163. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
164. For a discussion about Brown's contribution to the Civil Rights
Movement and the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see generally
KLUGER, supra note 3, at 582-747; Michael J. Klarman, Brown at 50, 90 VA. L.
REV. 1613 (2004); Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of
Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693 (2004); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of
Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994).
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the second time in less than a century, federal legislation
promised equality for African Americans.
The following discussion focuses on the legal
developments in the field of education, which parallel
developments in other areas of civil rights law. 16
The
discussion traces judicial doctrinal developments in the
aftermath of Brown and critically discusses the practical
implementation of the equality principle. Specifically, these
developments will be analyzed through the lens of the
166
transformative and individualist approaches.
a.

Brown's Promise
The constitutional mandate for equality embodied in the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides the legal framework for dealing with the issue of
equal educational opportunity. 167 Neither the Constitution
nor federal statutes provide an explicit fundamental right to
education. 168 Yet, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that
if a state provides public education, which is the case in all
states, it must do so indiscriminately. Additionally, Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded
169
educational programs.
165. After all, achieving equal educational opportunities has been a top
priority of the Civil Rights Movement since its inception. See PETER EDELMAN,
SEARCHING FOR AMERICA'S HEART: RFK AND THE RENEWAL OF HOPE 207 (2001)
("No institution is more important to help children acquire the tools they need
to escape poverty and do their best in life than the public schools."); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1476 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that the
purpose of integration is to guarantee equal education opportunities for AfricanAmerican students).
166. See supra Part I (discussing the transformative and individualist
approaches).
167. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment governs
discrimination by the states. Discrimination by the federal government falls
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954) (construing the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause to incorporate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
and applying it to the federal government).
168. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973)
(finding that education is not a fundamental right). The Rodriguez decision
dealt with cases where the state financing system created "only relative
differences in spending levels" and therefore did not directly address the
question whether access to a minimally adequate education is a fundamental
right. BELL, supra note 9, at 216 n.10 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000). Title IX of the Education Amendments of
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Contemporary legal efforts toward equal education focus
extensively on the issue of racial integration.1 7 ° The Brown
Court ordered desegregation to occur "with all deliberate
speed." 7
More than a decade later, as defiance by many
school authorities continued, the requirement of "all
deliberate speed" turned into a mandate of "now." The Court
in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County17 2 made
it clear that the "burden on a school board today is to come
forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." 7 3 Segregated school
systems were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to
take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a
unitary system in which racial discrimination would be
eliminated root and branch." 74 Thus, an immediate remedial
action was judicially
mandated
to combat
racial
175
segregation.
1972 adopts a similar prohibition for discrimination on the basis of gender. See
20 U.S.C. § 1681.
170. BROOKS ET AL., supra note 154, at 90-203.

171. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I/), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). There was a
second Brown case because the Court did not address the remedy issue in the
initial decision. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 US 483 (1954).
Explaining its reluctance to order an immediate remedy, as it usually does
when finding illegal practices, the Court stated that time was required to deal
with "complexities arising from the transition to a system of public education
freed from racial discrimination ....
But it should go without saying that the
vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them." Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 300-01. By ordering
desegregation to occur with "all deliberate speed," as opposed to the immediate
relief requested by the petitioners, the Court seems to have sanctioned, if not
encouraged, delay in desegregation efforts. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 19601972, at 366 (1990); LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE NEGRO 351 (1966) (writing that while the first Brown
ruling was "a great decision," the second was "a great mistake"). But see Bickel,
supra note 161, at 196 (arguing that the Court's "all deliberate speed" is a
defensible approach).
172. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
173. Id. at 436. See also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)
("The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out . . ").

174. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-39 (stating that the court "should retain
jurisdiction until it is clear that state-imposed segregation has been completely
removed").
175. Essentially this is an "affirmative duty" to desegregate that illustrates
the idea that school boards after Brown are under a continuing duty to act that
is not eliminated merely because no complaints were filed. Green, 391 U.S. at
437-38; Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood, supra note 20, at 37.
Apparently, Green's requirement for affirmative disestablishment has never
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In Swann
v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,'7 6 the Court held that district courts have broad
equitable authority to rectify a finding of an intentionally
segregated public school system, including the re-assignment
of students, alteration of school attendance zones, and schoolbusing, all based on race-specific considerations.1 77 In Keyes
v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,7 ' the Court
considered the lawfulness of school segregation in Denver.
Unlike Brown, which addressed school systems that were de
jure segregated by law, Keyes addressed a segregated school
system that was never mandated by law. It ruled that "a
been truly met by states. BELL, supra note 9, at 209-212.
However, in
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976), the Court
disapproved a lower court order requiring annual readjustments of school
boundary lines to ensure that no school had a majority of minority pupils, thus
limiting the power of federal courts to require continual readjustments of
district lines to attain unitary, racially balanced status. Id. at 424. According
to Spangler, re-segregation might occur as a result of demographic patterns
despite prior compliance with desegregation orders. Id. at 427. It seems that
after Spangler, the affirmative duty doctrine applies only to those school
systems that maintained statutorily mandated segregation, such as those in the
Brown cases. See discussion infra Part II.B.2. For a critique of Spangler, see
Freeman, supra note 15, at 1111 (asserting that "[Spangler] marks the full
restoration of the perpetrator perspective in school desegregation cases"). See
also Lawrence, SegregarionMisunderstood, supra note 20, at 48-50.
176. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
177. Id. at 22-32. The use of such judicial authority has come to be known as
"Swann remedies." BROOKS ET AL., supra note 154, at 170. In the aftermath of
Swann, a hostile Congress enacted legislation purporting to curb transportation
of students as a remedy for achieving desegregation by prohibiting the
allocation of federal funds for the use of such student busing. The Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1651-56 (2000). Furthermore, § 1652
prohibited federal agencies from requiring states to use funds to achieve racial
balance unless constitutionally required. Id. § 1652. However, the Court
interpreted this legislation as not applicable to endeavors to rectify legally
mandated, de jure discrimination. See, e.g., Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228
(1972); Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). School
busing is a major element in achieving a degree of desegregation that is
unreachable through other means. Busing, in particular, drew a great deal of
white resentment along with intense attacks on the Court for allegedly
encouraging white families to flee to the suburbs to avoid the reach of busing,
resulting in increased segregation in urban schools. BELL, supra note 9, 177185. It was the Court's unwillingness to include the suburbs in multi-district
desegregation plans that fed re-segregation by excluding these white suburbs
from judicial desegregation decrees. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.b; LINO A.
GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 277-281 (1976) (critiquing busing); James S. Liebman,
DesegregatingPolitics: "All-Out"School DesegregationExplained, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 1463, 1621-24 (1990) (critiquing anti-busing arguments).
178. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates
a presumption that other segregated schooling within the
system is not adventitious."' 79 As the Court stated, "common
sense dictates the conclusion that racially inspired school
board actions have an impact beyond the particular schools
that are subject to those actions." 180
2. Narrowing Brown's Promise
a.

Intent Requirement

While Swann and Keyes reaffirmed Brown's ruling that
racial segregation subordinated African Americans in
violation of their equal protection rights, these cases focused
the Court's attention toward the distinction between the
intent of government actions and the effects of those actions.
Ultimately, the Court narrowed the reach of the antisegregation mandate. It read Brown to prohibit only de jure,
or intentional, either by law or policy, segregation, not de
facto segregation, which arises from a combination of social
factors not seen as directly resulting from intentional school
segregation.' 1 This jurisprudential shift marked the Court's
preference for the individualist ideology, embracing the
narrow perpetrator perspective for discrimination.
According to Swann and Keyes, the desegregation
mandate extends only to "racial discrimination through
official action."18 2 Plaintiffs would have to "prove not only
that segregated schooling exists, but also that it was brought
about or maintained by intentional state action." 83 This type
of analysis has prevailed at the expense of the broader
promise of eradicating existing conditions of segregation, as
envisioned by the transformative ideology." 4 The purpose of
applying the constitutionally mandated remedy was thus

179. Id. at 208.
180. Id. at 203.
181. Keyes, in particular, set the distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation, as the Court emphasized that "the differentiating factor between de
jure segregation and so-called de facto segregation . . . is purpose or intent to
segregate." Id. at 208.
182. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 32 (1971).
183. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198.
184. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 638-45.
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undermined and the vision of Brown narrowed. 185
Hence, in Milliken v. Bradley, 86 the Court limited its
judicial remedy to school districts where de jure segregation
was established.187 Even a finding of the state's, as opposed
to the district's, constitutional violation in this regard was
insufficient for the purposes of a broad inter-district
remedy.188 As a result, conditions of de facto segregation,
which arise in the absence of official race-specific
classifications, escaped judicial scrutiny. On the practical
level, this meant that full integration of school systems by
consolidating predominantly African-American inner-city
schools with those of predominantly white-surrounding
suburbs was blocked. 89 Milliken marked a clear departure
from the promised results of earlier cases by limiting the
breadth of desegregation remedies. 90
Similarly, in Missouri v. Jenkins,19 ' the Court invalidated
a district court order that attempted to draw white students
from outside the district into the segregated city schools in
order to improve the quality of education within the school

185. See id. Throughout this process, the Court itself changed and the
unanimous Brown Court became sharply divided, as between 1969 and 1992,
nine appointments were made by Republican presidents and none by
Democratic presidents. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
466 (4th ed. 2001).
186. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
187. In a five-to-four decision, it held that a constitutional violation by one
school district is not sufficient justification for the imposition of a cross-district
remedy. Id. at 744. The majority opined that the controlling principle in this
context is that the "scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation." Id.
188. Id. at 727-48.
189. Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood,supra note 20, at 15 (writing that
the multi-district remedy "was the last hope for the meaningful integration of
schools in a nation whose urban-suburb demography was becoming increasingly
segregated").
190. On appeal from the Milliken I remand, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken I/), 433 U.S. 267 (1977), approved a desegregation remedy that went
beyond race-based pupil reassignment. The plan required broad educational
reforms, including programs to eliminate the effects of past discrimination,
counseling, and career guidance program for students. Id. at 274-277. These
programs were part of an effort "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct
to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Id. at
280 (quoting Milliken 1, 433 U.S. at 746). However, the judicial remedies
advocated in Milliken If were substantially restricted by Missouri v. Jenkins
(JenkinsII), 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
191. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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district. 19 2 Such an inter-district goal, according to the Court,
exceeded the district court's remedial authority because it
was beyond the scope of the intra-districtviolation found by

the district court. 193
Thus understood, Milliken and Jenkins clearly embrace
the individualist ideology. In doing so, the Court condoned
single-race schools, and the large qualitative disparities
associated with them.9 4 The following discussion will show
the Court's strict adherence to the individualist ideology
through the full adoption of the "fault" and "causation"
principles embodied in the perpetrator perspective.
As
discussed in Part I, this perspective was adopted at the
expense of a broader racial justice vision that considers the
overall life conditions of the minority group. 195 In the end,
embracing the individualist ideology reveals the Court's
tolerance for inequalities suffered by African Americans not
just in education, but in social and political areas as well. 9 6

192. Id. at 74.
193. The Court concluded that the order was "simply too far removed from an
acceptable implementation of a permissible means to remedy previous legally
mandated segregation." Id. at 100. Justice O'Connor opined that substantial
segregation is being perpetuated by the "white exodus" from the inner cites, but
such "natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces" are beyond the reach of the
Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 111-12 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The
unfortunate fact of racial imbalance and bias in our society, however pervasive
or invidious, does not admit of judicial intervention absent a constitutional
violation."). Similarly, Justice Thomas admonished lower courts not to "confuse
the consequences of de jure segregation with the results of larger social forces or
of private decisions." Id. at 115 (Thomas, J., concurring). Compare Justice
Ginsburg's separate dissenting opinion, emphasizing the historical perspective
of the case: "Given the deep, inglorious history of segregation in Missouri, to
curtail desegregation at this time and in this manner is an action at once too
swift and too soon." Id. at 176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
194. In his dissenting opinion in Milliken, Justice Marshall wrote:
Ironically purporting to base its result on the principle that the scope of
the remedy in a desegregation case should be determined by the nature
and the extent of the constitutional violation, the Court's answer is to
provide no remedy at all for the violation proved in this case, thereby
guaranteeing that Negro children in Detroit will receive the same
separate and inherently unequal education in the future as they have
been unconstitutionally afforded in the past.
Milliken 1, 433 U.S. at 782 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
195. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1053.
196. See generally Frank R. Parker, The Damaging Consequences of the
Rehnquist Court's Commitment to Color-Blindness Versus Racial Justice, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 763, 773 (1996).
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Brown in the Educational Context Today

The Court's stance in Milliken and Jenkins raises a few
key questions. Was Brown limited to de jure segregationeither by laws or by intentional state actions? Or was it
supposed to be extended to any segregated schools? Are these
de facto, single-race schools really a result of neutral social
forces that, in turn, bear no constitutional accountability?
that
"separate
Brown's statement
Undoubtedly
educational facilities are inherently unequal" can be
interpreted to prohibit segregated education, regardless of the
sources of the segregation.'9 7 Civil rights activists have long
argued that no distinction should be made between de jure
and de facto segregation and that a court should order relief
based on the harmfulness of racial segregation, regardless of
any fault on the part of school districts.198 In his compelling
critique of Milliken and its progeny, Professor Charles
Lawrence suggests that the Brown holding
makes most sense if it is understood as a recognition of
the fact that racial segregation by definition is an
invidious labeling device and therefore must violate the
Equal Protection Clause.... The institution of segregation
and the injury it inflicts on blacks are necessarily
that its chief purpose
misunderstood until one recognizes
199
is to define, not to separate.
20 0
Three major points are crucial to this recognition:
First, the injury inflicted upon black children by
segregation is one of pejorative classification. This injury
occurs by virtue of the existence of the system or

197. See ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN

GOVERNMENT 78 (1976); see also Michael Kiarman, An Interpretive History of
Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 280-82 (1991) (arguing that the

Warren Court would likely have dismissed the distinction between de jure and
de facto segregation); see generally WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S

LANDMARK CIL RIGHTS DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (a thorough

treatment of the Brown's meaning).
198. BELL, supra note 9, at 175 n.15.
199. Lawrence, Segregation Misunderstood, supra note 20, at 24-25.
Accordingly, Lawrence points to the failure of the Court in Brown to articulate
clearly the fact that "the manifest purpose of segregation was to designate
blacks as inferior" and that "such a purpose was constitutionally
impermissible." Id. at 43. Instead, "the Court chose to focus upon the effect of
school segregation." Id.
200. Id. at 45-46.
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institution of segregation rather than particular
segregating acts. Second, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is violated by significant state
involvement in the creation or maintenance of the
sociopolitical system of segregation, and the constitutional
rights of black children are violated whenever the state
acts to perpetuate that system. This is true without
regard to whether the purpose or direct result of the act is
the segregation of schools themselves, and such a
constitutional violation may not be limited in scope by the
boundaries of a school district or other subdivision of the
state.
Third, the affirmative duty to disestablish
segregation, as set forth in Green v. County School Board,
must apply to all states that have played a predominant
role in its establishment, regardless of their geographic
location or the date upon which statutes
mandating
20 1
segregation were removed from their books.
Indeed, in a society with an undisputed history of racial
subordination, the line between de jure and de facto
segregation might simply be an illusion.
When race
interferes with the way people conduct their affairs, including
choosing their homes and neighborhoods, the distinction
between segregation resulting from official state actions and
segregation arising from social conditions is misleading
because those social conditions are also racially driven.2 2 In
fact, as transformativists have argued, de facto school
segregation has been the result of past and present active
state action at one level or another.2 3
For example, segregated housing resulted largely from
active government involvement in mortgage practices, the
location of public housing, and zoning regulation.2 4 This has
201. Id. (footnotes omitted).
202. Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 679-81 ("Decades of governmentsponsored housing discrimination have significantly shaped patterns of
residential segregation. Contrary to the notion that racial segregation occurs
because of 'natural' migration patterns, ample evidence demonstrates the
connection between government actions and private behavior. The lingering
effects of Jim Crow laws, coupled with current real estate policies and practices,
government housing starts, and lending and zoning practices, have isolated
black Americans in the inner cities and poorer suburbs." (footnotes omitted)).
203.

See generally IN PURSUIT OF A DREAM DEFERRED: LINKING HOUSING

AND EDUCATION POLICY (John A. Powell, Gavin Kearney, & Vina Kay eds.,

2001) (demonstrating how race is implicated in one way or another in all
government actions and policies).
204. See Lawrence, SegregationMisunderstood, supra note 20, at 38-40
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been coupled with white families moving from the poor innercities to the affluent suburbs." 5 The fact that the Court has
left these residential patterns out of its constitutional
remedies has created a cycle of racial re-segregation: poor
African-American inner-cities and affluent white suburbs.2 °6
This result vindicates the transformativist assertion that
individualist theory operates to rationalize and perpetuate
societal inequalities.
Under a theoretical transformative
approach,
including white suburbs in multi-district
desegregation would have paved the way for multi-system
integration and, at the same time, removed the attraction of
the suburbs for white families who seek to avoid compelled
integration.
School segregation and housing segregation are
intertwined, and allowing one fosters the other. 2 7 Adoption
of the individualist approach has limited Brown's
desegregation mandate to intentional segregative government
actions.
This limitation overlooks the racial history of
American society and falls short of redressing its devastating
impact.
By condoning current conditions of actual
segregation, the Milliken doctrine ensured a self-perpetuating
system of racial stigmatization.2 8
The Milliken doctrine
might be seen, then, as the most disastrous decision for race
relations in America since Plessy. Since Milliken, there has
205. This "white flight" has created all-African-American schools in the
inner-cities and relatively integrated schools in the suburbs. BELL, supra note
9, at 175-76; STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 465-471. Needless to say,
segregation in inner-cities has been coupled with blatant poverty. See Peter
Edelman, The Welfare Debate: Getting Past the Bumper Stickers, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 93, 96 (2003) ("Between 1970 and 1990 the number of urban poor
people living in census tracts with more than forty percent poverty nearly
doubled and approximately half of those living in such circumstances were
African-American."); EDELMAN, supra note 165, at 207; see also RACE, POVERTY,
AND AMERICAN CITIES (John Charles & Judith Wegner eds., 1996).
206. BELL, supra note 9, at 185 ("White suburbs have been insulated from
real integration and urban centers have been denied it."); Lawrence,
Segregation Misunderstood, supra note 20, at 15-16 ("The Milliken decision
assured middle-class whites that their mass exodus to the suburbs to seek
refuge from blacks had not been made in vain since the Supreme Court also
made clear that they would not use school desegregation to invade the suburban
fortress of housing for whites only.").
207. See Paul Gerwitz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 661
(1983) (discussing the interrelationship between housing segregation and
education segregation).
208. BELL, supra note 9, at 184-85; Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 64445.
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been no significant improvement in the desegregation of
American schools. °9 Instead, the Court has backed away
from the fight for integration, resulting in a perpetual racial
hierarchy in the education system, where schools are still
separate and still unequal.2 1 ° In the beginning of the 1990s,
"more black children attend[ed] racially isolated schools than
at any time since the early 1970s. "211
Affirming its adherence to the individualist approach
embraced in Milliken, the Court has further overturned
efforts by lower courts to block re-segregation through intradistrict remedies. In Austin Independent School District v.
United States,2 1 2 the Supreme Court invalidated a court order
mandating large-scale student busing within the school
district. 213
Similarly, in Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman,1 4 the Court vacated an order requiring
integration in the entire school system.21 5 The Court has
additionally curtailed efforts to block re-segregation through
continuous federal court supervision. This was the case in
2 16 Board of
Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,
7 and Freeman v. Pitts. 2 8
Education v. Dowell,"
209. See BELL, supra note 9, at 182-92.
210. See Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 709-20.
211. Julius L. Chambers, Black Americans and the Court: Has the Clock Been
turned Back Permanently?,in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 9, 19 (Nat'l Urban
League ed., 1990).
212. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
213. Id. at 995.
214. Dayton Bd. ofEduc. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
215. Id. at 424. Moreover, these cases further established "a presumption of
innocence in favor of the defendant school district," deemphasizing the
presumption in Keyes that once intentional segregation is proven in a
substantial portion of the school district, the burden shifts to the school district
to prove that segregation not intentional.
Lawrence, Segregation
Misunderstood, supra note 20, at 50-51. This retreat from Keyes placed the full
burden of proof on the plaintiffs, undermining a plaintiffs chances of obtaining
meaningful relief. See id.
216. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(invalidating an order requiring annual reassignment of pupils to maintain
unitary status, i.e., racial balance, so that no school had a majority of minority
pupils).
217. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991) (holding that a
federal district court should terminate its supervisory jurisdiction where the
school board "had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree" and
where "the vestige of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable").
Rejecting the majority formalistic interpretation of Brown,
Justice Marshall wrote in dissent that "a desegregation decree cannot be lifted
so long as conditions likely to inflict the stigmatic injury condemned in Brown I
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Taken together, these cases leave a great deal of de facto
re-segregation intact, regardless of the historic and
contemporary context of the segregation. 21 9 Based on the
individualist ideology's indifference to these results, cases
continue the trend of weakening desegregation jurisprudence
by solidifying the formalistic distinction between de jure and
de facto segregation. Requiring proof that current conditions
of segregation are a result of intentional government actions
has proved to be a formidable burden that plaintiffs have
been unable to shoulder.2 2 °
The willingness of the Court in Spangler, Dowell, and
Freeman to tolerate existing conditions of segregation departs
significantly from Brown's legacy that inequality is inherent
in racial segregation and that this inequality must be
redressed. 221 The ultimate consequence is to perpetuate this
inequality and the perception of inferiority. To redress this
injury, a transformative ideology is required, an ideology that
is sensitive to group-based social experiences, result-oriented,
and committed to societal transformation.
In the shadow of increasing de facto re-segregation and
funding disparities, many concerned civil rights advocates
have shifted their focus to the quality of education, even at

persist and there remain feasible methods of eliminating such conditions." Id.
at 252 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
218. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (holding that "federal courts
have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts in
incremental stages, before full compliance has been achieved in every area of
school operations").
219. Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 647. According to Spangler, the resegregation was a result of "quite normal pattern of human migration."
Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436. The Court overlooked the fact that much of the
racial composition of residential patterns has been driven by racist white flight
from blacks. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space:
What Lawyers Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28 (1989)
("[Spangler] illustrates the profound ways in which judicial power has helped to
shape the legal and social landscape so that a white parent who wants to resist
desegregation feels not a gravitational pull to accept racial integration as
inevitable, but instead a pull to follow her worst instincts and flee.").
220. BELL, supra note 9, at 137-44. STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 464474.
221. Justice Marshall's dissent in Freeman rightly reminds the Court that
conditions of racial separation "remain inherently unequal." Hayman & Levit,
supra note 49, at 727 (quoting Freeman, 503 U.S. at 648 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting)). See also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1470 (2004).
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the expense of racially balanced schools.22 2
Civil rights
advocates remain torn between their integration ideals and
the purely educational interests of African-American
children. It appears that W.E.B. Du Bois's insights are being
realized almost seven decades after he stated:
[There is no magic, either in mixed schools or in
segregated schools.
A mixed school with poor and
unsympathetic teachers, with hostile public opinion, and
no teaching of truth concerning black folk, is bad. A
segregated school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate
equipment, poor salaries, and wretched housing is equally
bad. Other things being equal, the mixed school is the
broader, more natural basis for the education of all youth.
It gives wider contacts; it inspires greater self-confidence;
and suppresses the inferiority complex. But other things
seldom are equal, and in that case Sympathy, Knowledge,
and the Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can
offer. 223
Dr. Du Bois's words appear to have predicted the current
situation. More importantly, they suggest the solutions to the
problem: a meaningful, transformative integration that
guarantees true multicultural and multi-racial integration.
Only such an approach can lead to true equal education by
guaranteeing group-level equality and integration.
In sum, the Court has adopted the narrow individualist
approach by reading the Equal Protection Clause to ban only
intentional, state-sanctioned segregation.
Under this
approach, proving a racially discriminatory purpose on the
part of the government actor is indispensable to establishing
a claim for a constitutional violation. This approach has

222. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client
Interest in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471-72 (1976)
(arguing that "traditional racial balance remedies are becoming increasingly
difficult to achieve or maintain" and that "racial balance may not be the relief
actually desired by the victims of segregated schools"); see also Amy Stuart
Wells et al., The Space Between School Desegregation Court Orders and
Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1722
(2004) ("The Brown decision was a historic ruling, clearly one of the most
significant Supreme Court decisions of the twentieth century. Still, despite the
optimism that this case fostered fifty years ago, school desegregation failed as a
public policy. Thus, today, we need to find alternative means of fulfilling the
promise of Brown within more racially separate schools.").
223. W.E.B. DU BOIS, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, in W.E.B. DU
BOIS: A READER 278, 288 (Meyer Weinberg ed., 1970).
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turned Brown's promise into an "empty victory," and has
failed to cure the lasting, pervasive effects of segregation and
the Jim Crow regime.2 24
However, this Supreme Court doctrine of intentional
discrimination was not limited solely to education. The
following discussion will demonstrate that the Court's retreat
from desegregation in the educational context was part of a
broader reluctance to respond positively to civil rights
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.
c.

Brown Today in OtherAreas

The Supreme Court's requirement of proof of intentional
discrimination to warrant the remedy of desegregation is part
of a broader constitutional doctrine of discriminatory purpose.
Absent discriminatory intent, there is no constitutional
violation and, subsequently, no legal remedy. Only upon a
finding of intentional racial discrimination will the
challenged governmental actions be subject to the most rigid
judicial review-strict, and usually fatal, scrutiny. 5
According to the strict scrutiny standard, the action is only
permitted when the government is able to show that it was
necessary to achieve a "compelling state interest" that could
not be achieved by other, less drastic means.22 6 The action
should therefore be narrowly tailored toward accomplishing a
compelling end.227

224. Flagg, supra note 75, at 969 (discussing the failure of the intent
requirement to effectuate substantive racial justice in America).
225. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[AIll legal
restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are
immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid
scrutiny."). See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 474-684 (discussing
the Supreme Court's "suspect classification" methodology).
226. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (overturning a
conviction that only criminalized conduct by an interracial couple, calling such a
racial classification "constitutionally suspect" and "'in most circumstances
irrelevant' to any constitutionally acceptable legislative purpose" (quoting
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320
U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
227. John Ely argues that the requirement of the strict scrutiny test meant
to screen out those acts in which the government actor's intention was to
deprive a group on the basis of race or another unconstitutional motive. JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 146

(1980).

A classification that in fact was unconstitutionally motivated will face

serious constitutional difficulty and is unlikely to survive the "special scrutiny."
Id.
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A corollary to the intent requirement is that a facially
neutral action that is occasioned with a disproportionate
burden on a racial group does not per se violate the
Constitution unless the action is intended to produce the
race-based result. This doctrine was clearly articulated in
Washington v. Davis228 where the Court approved the use of a
qualifying test administered to applicants for police officer
positions in Washington, D.C.229
A showing that a
disproportionate percentage of African Americans failed the
test was insufficient to establish a prima facie case for a
constitutional violation because no discriminatory intent was
proved.2 3 ° Under Davis's intentional discrimination doctrine,
racially discriminatory effects of a facially neutral action are
not per se unconstitutional and are not, therefore, subject to
strict scrutiny.23 1
The Davis Court adhered to the individualist approach to
equality.
In establishing and maintaining the intent
requirement and rejecting a result-based standard, the Court
emphasized several rationales that reflect an individualist
reading of the Equal Protection Clause. These include the
views that: result-oriented standards are based on raceconscious considerations that are incompatible with the
individualist rights covered by the Equal Protection Clause; a
result-based standard would grant benefits to individuals
based on their group affiliation to which they are otherwise
not entitled as an individual under the Equal Protection
Clause; and benefiting these individuals would inevitably
228. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

229. Id. at 232.
230. Davis rejected Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1970), a case of
employment discrimination decided under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. A unanimous Court required a justification for facially neutral practices
that produced racially disproportionate results. Id. at 436. Griggs altered the
concept of intent by focusing on consequences, ruling that if an employment
practice that operates to exclude African Americans cannot be shown to be
related to "job performance," the practice is prohibited. Id. This ruling
demonstrated for the first time that the Act proscribes not only "overt
discrimination," but also "practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation." Id. at 431. Although the decision was decided under Title VII, its
rationale and logic in emphasizing results was broad enough to be applicable
beyond Title VII. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1096-1097. Davis not only
eliminated all extra-Title VII implications of Griggs, but further lowered the
level of scrutiny thought to be required under Griggs in comparable antidiscrimination cases. Id. at 1114-1118.
231. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-40.
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mean unfairly harming other innocent people who bear no
responsibility for the existing conditions. 2
As was the case in the segregation context, Davis's focus
on the government actor's purpose overlooks history, real-life
experiences, and social and political realities. Davis fails to
recognize that many of the current conditions are the
lingering result of past, intentional discrimination. The poor
performance of African Americans in the test employed in
Davis is a function of the historically deficient educational
system African Americans endured under Jim Crow and
continue to endure today.23 3
On a substantive level, African Americans have suffered
from the continued existence of disparate racial and economic
conditions and an ongoing hostile social and political climate
of exclusion. These inequalities produce painful injuries,
regardless of motive. The intent requirement ultimately
serves to legitimize these injuries.23 4 On a practical level,
Davis underestimates the difficulty in uncovering hidden
discriminatory intent.2 35
It places an almost impossible
burden on the petitioners to prove invidious intent on the
part of a public actor.23 6 As a result, Davis's doctrine severely
curtails the cases in which courts will recognize racial
discrimination, leaving many African Americans with no legal
remedy.23 7
232. Id. at 245-46.
233. See Charles R. Lawrence III, "Justice"or "JustUs". Racism and the Role
of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 849 n.69 (1983) (reviewing DAVID L. KIRP,
JUST SCHOOLS: THE IDEA OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN EDUCATION (1982))

(noting that African Americans' poor performance on standardized employment
tests could be directly traced to the history of formal racial discrimination
suffered by them); see also Harris, supra note 36, at 1713. See generally
DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF

RACISM (1992).
234. See, e.g., Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The
Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, -49 STAN. L. REV. 111 (1997)
(arguing that by condoning facially neutral actions the Court may be
legitimizing and thereby maintaining practices that perpetuate historic forms of
racial subordination); Delgado, supra note 129, at 1396.
235. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational
Context for Black American Inclusion, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 41, 50 (1987) (arguing
that "the modern forms of prejudice frequently remain invisible even to its
perpetrators"); see also Flagg, supra note 75, at 957.
236. BELL, supra note 9, at 137-44; Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, supra note 64, at 369-76; Crenshaw, supra note 15, at 1379-81.
237. Similar strict adherence to the concept of intent as a prerequisite for
constitutional violation has been evidenced in many other areas of life,
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By adopting the individualist process-based view of
equality in Davis,238 the Court has limited its role to
addressing solely official-symbolic subordination while
condoning conditions of substantive material subordination.2 39
This indifference to the real-life conditions of African
Americans clearly demonstrates that the Court approaches
racial discrimination exclusively from the narrow perpetrator
perspective rather than the broad victim perspective.2 4 ° The
unfortunate result is that
[Tihe actual conditions of racial powerlessness, poverty,
and unemployment can be regarded as no more than
conditions-not as racial discrimination. Those conditions
can then be rationalized by treating them as historical
accidents or products of a malevolent fate, or, even worse,
by blaming the victims as inadequate to function in the
good society.241
In his seminal work, The Id, the Ego, and the Equal
Protection Clause: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
Professor Lawrence suggests an alternative manner of
addressing anti-discrimination cases. 242 He emphasizes that
individualist intention-based constitutionalism, which denies
consideration for disparate impact cases, is to a large extent
ineffective in dealing with the true discriminatory conditions
experienced daily by African Americans.24 3
African
Americans and the nation at large would be better off if the
Court would accept as proof of racial discrimination evidence
regarding the historical, cultural, and social context in which
the decision was delivered. 2" Such evidence might reveal an
actual manifestation of racial bias, even if unconscious, on the

including housing, see, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and criminal justice, see, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
238. See discussion supra Part I.D.4 (discussing Equality as a Result v.
Equality as a Process).
239. See discussion supra Part I.D.2 (discussing Material Subordination v.
Symbolic Subordination).
240. See discussion supra Part I.D.3 (discussing Victim Perspective v.
Perpetrator Perspective).
241. Freeman, supra note 15, at 1103. See also Flagg, supra note 75, at 969.
242. See generally Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra
note 64.
243. Id. at 323.
244. Id. at 355-56.
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part of the public actor.2 45 If these decisions persist without
being legally recognized, they will continue to contribute to
the real life conditions of racial inequality by rationalizing
and nurturing these conditions.24 6 Public actors, in turn, will
continue to abdicate any responsibility for the consequences
of their decisions, convinced that they exercise their authority
with impartiality.2 4 7
Lawrence argues that the key concept in the Court's
either
theory-that
"facially
neutral
actions
[are]
intentionally and unconstitutionally or unintentionally and
constitutionally discriminatory"-is a false dichotomy.2 48 This
is because "a large part of the behavior that produces racial
discrimination
is influenced
by unconscious
racial
motivation"249 and this unconscious racism should also be
uncovered. 250
Therefore, he emphasizes that the "equal
protection doctrine must address the unconscious racism that
underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact of
251
governmental policy."
Lawrence emphasizes that racism is a part of the
common American historical experience and, therefore, a part
of American culture.25 2 Founded on racial subordination, this
culture has produced cultural symbols that have racial
meaning.2 3 Because governmental actors are themselves a
part of this culture, their decisions might be influenced by
racist beliefs, even if they are not consciously aware of these
beliefs.25 4 Therefore, he proposes a standard that
would look to the 'cultural meaning' of an allegedly
racially discriminatory act as the best available analogue

245. Id.
246. Id. at 325, 387.
247. Id. at 349.
248. Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at 322,
328-44 (discussing evidence of unconscious racism).
249. Id. at 322.
250. Id. at 349 ("Where a society has recently adopted a moral ethic that
repudiates
racial
disadvantaging
for its
own
sake,
governmental
decisionmakers are as likely to repress their racial motives as they are to lie to
courts or to attempt after-the-fact rationalizations of classifications that are not
racial on their face but that do have disproportionate racial impact.").
251. Id. at 355; Flagg, supra note 75, at 957.
252. Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at 322-

23.
253. See id. at 324.
254. Id.
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for and evidence of the collective unconscious that we
cannot observe directly.
This test would evaluate
governmental conduct to see if it conveys a symbolic
message to which the culture attaches racial significance.
The court would analyze governmental behavior much like
a cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence
regarding the historical and social context in which the
decision was made and effectuated.
If the court
determined by the preponderance of the evidence that a
significant portion of the population thinks of the
governmental action in racial terms, then it would
presume that socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes
made evident by the action's meaning had influenced the
decisionmakers. As a result, it would apply heightened
255
scrutiny.

Lawrence's suggestions might be understood as a
compromise between the Court's strict individualist view of
exclusive reliance on intentional discrimination and the
opposing view that would completely abandon such a
requirement by recognizing all government actions with
discriminatory effects. 256 This is done by identifying those
cases where race unconsciously influences governmental
action, while leaving intact decisions that disproportionately
burden African Americans only because they are overrepresented or underrepresented among the targets or
beneficiaries of the action such as sales taxes, bridge tolls,
fees for obtaining a driver's license, or the cost of a building
permit.2 57
Lawrence's suggestion is squarely on point. Otherwise,
too many state actions that harm African Americans are left
untouched by the Court's individualist approach, only to

255. Id. at 355-56.
256. See id. at 324; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA.
L. REV. 245, 275 (1983) (arguing that some racially disproportionate effects of
governmental action ought to be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny, and
citing the persistent disproportionate presence of African Americans among the
poor as the main difficulty for adopting increased scrutiny in all racially
disparate impact cases).
257. These cases are pointed out by the Davis Court as examples of the
overreach of the disparate impact doctrine. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
248 n.14 (1976). Because American culture does not think of the impact of these
fees in racial terms, it is unlikely that unconscious racial attitudes influenced
the decision-maker in setting policy. Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, supra note 64, at 364-65.
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become part of the system that reinforces racial inequalities
and denies African Americans "the status of full humanity."25
C. State Action That Benefits: InvalidatingAffirmative
Action Programs
The transformative, race-based, result-oriented approach
rejected by the Court in Davis was African Americans' best
hope for transforming their plight in American society.
Instead, the intentional discrimination requirement has
served to legitimize discrimination.25 9 The other hope for
African-American advancement was the implementation of
comprehensive affirmative action programs, as these
programs
could
compensate
for
past
systematic
26
°
discrimination.
The Davis doctrine meant that the State is
not under a legal obligation to take race into account to
guarantee a racially balanced result. 61 But would racespecific considerations be constitutional if the government
pursues them to the benefit of African Americans? 262 In
providing a negative answer, the Court fully adhered to the
individualist ideology, extinguishing the hopes of African
Americans to transform their socioeconomic conditions and
achieve genuine group-level equality.2 63
To briefly recap, the Court adopted a wholesale
prohibition of racial classification, embodied in a per se rule of
color-blindness&I Under this approach, the Constitution is
fully colorblind
and every intentionally
race-based
classification will be strictly scrutinized by the court and
usually invalidated. According to this symmetrical view, no
distinction will be made between benign, race-based actions
designed to benefit African Americans and invidious, racebased actions meant to disadvantage African Americans.2 6 5

258. Lawrence, Reckoning with UnconsciousRacism, supra note 64, at 369.
259. Id. at 383-84.
260. See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 553-95.
261. See Lawrence, Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, supra note 64, at
319.
262. STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 553.
263. See id. at 553-95; discussion supra Part I.D.4.
264. BELL, supra note 9, at 134-36. See generally STONE ET AL., supra note
185, at 553 (considering the Court's treatment of race-specific classifications
that benefit minorities).
265. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995)
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("R]nder our Constitution there can be no such thing as
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The leading cases in which the Supreme Court applied
strict scrutiny to strike down affirmative action programs are
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 266 and Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.26 7
Each of the challenged
programs was designed to enhance economic opportunities for
minority-owned businesses and redress the effects of past
discrimination in the construction industry. Similarly, in the
context of university admissions, the Court in Bakke struck
down a race-based admissions policy designed to increase the
number of disadvantaged minority students and to
either a creditor or a debtor race."); BELL, supra note 9, at 145; Richard
Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice: Or, Do You Really Want
to Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222, 1223-24 (1991) (critiquing
affirmative action programs from the left and arguing that the system bases
inclusion of racial minorities on principles "of social utility, not reparations or
rights"). Delgado further notes that:
[Aiffirmative action serves as a homeostatic device, assuring that only
a small number of ... people of color are hired or promoted. Not too
many, for that would be terrifying, nor too few, for that would be
destabilizing. Just the right small number, generally those of us who
need it least, are moved ahead.
Id. at 1224.
266. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). In Croson, the
Court stuck down a set-aside program adopted by the City of Richmond,
requiring prime contractors on city projects to subcontract at least 30% of the
dollar amount of the contract to minority business enterprises. Id. In adopting
the plan, the city relied inter alia on a study which indicated that, while African
Americans constituted 50% of the general population in Richmond, less than 1%
of the city's prime construction contracts had been awarded to minority
businesses. Id. at 479. The Court noted that the city failed to prove that past
discrimination had impeded minorities from participating fully in Richmond's
construction industry, and ruled that the program was not narrowly tailored to
remedy the effects of prior discrimination. Id. at 507-09.
267. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In Adarand
Constructors, a federal affirmative action program implemented by the United
States Department of Transportation was at stake. Id. The program gave
general contractors on government highway construction projects a financial
incentive to hire subcontractors owned by minorities. Id. at 205. The Court
made it clear for the first time that all racial classifications imposed by any
federal, state, or local governmental actor must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny. Id. at 236. In striking down the program, the majority held that the
federal government failed to prove that past racial discrimination interfered
with the awarding of highway construction contracts. Id. at 238-39. Thus,
Adarand Constructors marked a doctrinal departure from a 1980 precedent
requiring that federal affirmative action programs be reviewed under a lower
and more forgiving standard of review with deference to Congressional powers.
See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (applying an intermediate
scrutiny standard to uphold a federal race-specific set-aside program requiring
that at least 10% of federal grants to work projects be expended for minority
business enterprises).
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compensate them for historical discrimination. 268
Most
recently, the court in Gratz invalidated an undergraduate
admission program that automatically assigned additional
In reaching these
points to minority applicants.2 6 9
conclusions, the Court expressed concerns that such racebased plans burden innocent non-minority members, while at
the same time benefiting minority members that might not
have suffered any discrimination.2 7 °
The
Court's
adoption
of wholesale
colorblind
constitutionalism and subsequent application of strict
scrutiny in affirmative action programs has significant
ideological implications in relation to the Court's commitment
to racial equality. While in Davis the Court prohibited itself
from considering claims of group-based results in establishing
constitutional liability, in Adarand Constructors the Court
further prohibited the government from employing groupbased programs for any purpose.2 7 ' If Davis is judicial
deference to public actors, similar deference in Adarand
Constructorswould have resulted in a different holding. The
circle of the individualist ideology is now complete. The
Court's embrace of the individualist colorblind ideology
means that the same public institutions that historically
employed
systematic
discrimination
against
African

268. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977)
(plurality ruling that a university admissions policy that set aside sixteen
percent of its admissions seats for disadvantaged minorities violated the equal
protection rights of non-minority applicants), with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003) (upholding a university admission program designed to ensure racial
and ethnic diversity in which race, among other variables, provided a plus
characteristic favoring admission); see also Harry T. Edwards, The Journey
From Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial
Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944 (2004).
269. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking down an undergraduate
admission program that assigned twenty points for minority applicants, or onefifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve the school's
interest in diversity).
270. Under the strict scrutiny standard, race-based plans are not "narrowly
tailored" to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S.
at 507-09; Adarand Constructors,515 U.S. at 235-38.
271. BELL, supra note 9, at 136-154 (a profound critical race theory critique
of the coulorblindness doctrine). See STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 589
("Why doesn't the government have a compelling interest in remedying
pervasive, generalized discrimination"); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Groups, Politics, and the Equal Protection Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L.
REV.35 (2004).
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Americans are now also prohibited from attempting to correct
the contemporary effects of their own wrong doing.
More importantly, the doctrinal application of strict
scrutiny in the affirmative action context represents a
comprehensive ideology that subordinates substantive
equality to formal equality. This blind formal approach bears
resemblance to the legal ideology that produced Plessy over a
hundred years earlier.27 2 Such jurisprudential formalism
perpetuates the economic, social, and political disadvantages
of African Americans, as well as their exclusion from the
centers of power in American society. Indeed, formalism was
used to condone actions that disproportionately burdened
African Americans, and formalism is currently used to
invalidate affirmative action efforts to move AfricanAmericans forward. 7 3
D. PartII Conclusion
The complete picture drawn by the Court's rulings
concerning racial equality in the last three decades is one
that reverts African Americans to living conditions of
separate-by condoning conditions of segregation in schooling
and housing-and unequal-as racially disparate effects
continue as a result of government actions. Indeed, studies
show that in the late 1990s, two-thirds of African-American
students attended predominantly minority schools 2 74 and that
the achievement gap between African-American and white
27 5
schools is substantial and growing.
Part II demonstrates that this new de facto, separate-butunequal reality has largely been reinforced due to the Court's
strict embrace of the narrow individualist ideology. The
discriminatory intent requirement, coupled with the rejection
of race-based, result-oriented claims, results in the
272. See BELL, supra note 9, at 137.
273. See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 52, at 53-63 (arguing that a colorblind
doctrine serves to legitimate, and thereby perpetuate, the socioeconomic
advantages that whites have been holding over minorities in all spheres of life
in America).
274. Frank R. Kemerer, School Choice Accountability, in SCHOOL CHOICE
AND SOCIAL CONTROVERSY: POLITICS, POLICY, AND LAw 181, 188-89 (Stephen D.

Sugarman & Frank R. Kemerer eds., 1999).
275. Lawrence C. Stedman, An Assessment of the ContemporaryDebate over
U.S. Achievement, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EDUCATION POLICY 53 (Diane
Ravitch ed. 1998).
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rationalization of harsh inequalities in the educational, social,
and
economic
experiences
of African Americans. 7 6
Furthermore, the embrace of a wholesale colorblind approach,
which invalidates affirmative efforts to address some of these
inequalities, has perpetuated the present material conditions
of racial injustice largely linked to past institutional
discrimination. These conditions include, for instance, the
fact that at the end of the 1990s the unemployment rate
among African Americans was almost double that of the total
U.S. unemployment rate,2 77 that the poverty rate among
African Americans was more than double that of whites,2 78
and that white median income was more than one and a half
times that of African-American median income. 9
The individualist ideology has blocked any meaningful
transformation of these conditions. It has failed to bring
African Americans any meaningful relief from the urgent
socio-economic needs they encounter as a result of historical
discrimination.2 8 °
Instead, individualist ideology has
operated to perpetuate their exclusion from the centers of
power in American society.2 8 ' Considering the pervasiveness
276. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 150-60 (1993); see also
Bonilla-Silva, supra note 76, at 78-84 (discussing the social mechanisms that
have produced and perpetuated racial inequality in the post-civil rights era).
See generally ROY L. BROOKS, RETHINKING OF THE AMERICAN RACE PROBLEM

(1990) (discussing the socioeconomic inequalities between African Americans
and whites in almost every area).
277. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1999, at 430 tbl.680 (119th ed. 1999). In 1998, while the AfricanAmerican unemployment rate was 8.9%, the total U.S. unemployment rate was
4.5%. Id.
278. Id. at 483 tbl.760.
279. Between 1970 and 1997, African-American median income was
approximately 59% of white median income. Id. at 474 tbls.742 & 743. See also
Bonilla-Silva, supra note 76, at 78-84 (concluding that although many of African
Americans' socioeconomic conditions are a manifestation of the legacies of
slavery and the Jim Crow era, the overall conditions of African Americans
relative to whites has not advanced much since the 1960s).
280. See Freeman, supra note 15, at 1102 (concluding that while in the first
two decades after Brown the Court managed to offer African Americans
'expectations of proportional racial political power" and 'a working system of
equality of opportunity," in the next era "these expectations were systematically
defeated and only the perpetrator perspective was preserved").
281. Bonilla-Silva, supra note 76, at 64-68 (discussing under-representation
of African Americans among elected and appointed officials, as well as the
limited political possibilities of those elected or appointed); SPANN, supra note
276, at 121-22 ('[AIll United States presidents have been white; all but two
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of this exclusion, only a methodical adoption of the
transformative ideology offers any realistic hope for real
social change for African Americans. What is needed is a
group-based recognition of the collective African-American
experience
with
regards
to
social
and
economic
transformation of their community's poor conditions. This is
a demand for substantive equality-for de facto equality in
real life-that duly addresses the wounds of past
discrimination.
In fact, in each case discussed in Part II, there was a
legally viable alternative for the Court to deliver a ruling that
would have been more responsive to African-American group
experiences.
Consider, for example, approving the
desegregation inter-district remedy in Milliken;8 2 endorsing
the desegregation orders in Jenkins,28 Austin Independent
School District,8 4 and Brinkman;2 5 invalidating the
qualifying test in Davis; 28 6 endorsing the affirmative action
programs in Bakke, 287 Croson,288 Adarand Constructors,28 9 and
Gratz.290 Taken together, such hypothetical rulings would
have paved the way for genuine advancement of the poor
conditions of African Americans.
Instead, the Court, represented by its current majority, is
endorsing and legitimizing racial subordination in America.
There is no other way to describe the Court's insistence on a
strict adherence to the individualist, colorblind ideology in
the face of its clear failure to effectuate substantive racial
equality. Does the Court's current majority act in such a way
because they themselves are committed to a hierarchical
racial relationship, or because they are expressing a
dominant political climate that would render contrary
decisions judicially unsustainable?
Are they operating,

United States senators have been white; the overwhelming majority of United
States representatives has been white .... .") See generally DERRICK BELL, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
supra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
supra notes 39, 268 and accompanying text.
supra note 266 and accompanying text.
supra note 267 and accompanying text.
supra note 269 and accompanying text.
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consciously or unconsciously, to protect the self-interest of the
dominant group to which they belong?29 Or are they
expressing a sound institutional deference in light of
surrounding political forces?
Whatever the answer, the
outcome remains that the legacy of white privilege and
African-American subordination lives and thrives. The color
line in America might be less bright today, but it seems to be
more solid than ever.
Much of the work of the Civil Rights Movement remains
unfinished. If one looks at the cup as half-full, Brown has
clearly improved the status of African Americans. It has
opened the doors to integrated schools, integrated public
accommodations, and established the principle of antidiscrimination as an integral part of American norms.2 92
Looking at the cup as half-empty, socio-economic statistics
show that the subordinating structures have been
reinforced.2 93 Most disappointing might be the fact that the
Civil Rights Movement today seems to have lost its internal
organizational and spiritual power essential to mobilization of
the masses.2 94
Currently, there is a need for judicial leadership that is
dedicated enough to understand the historic roots of
inequality, and courageous enough to articulate the mandate
of equality in a firm, clear, and uncompromising manner.
However, instead of leading the way to healing, the Court has
served to reinforce too many of the historical wounds.

291. Only two African Americans were ever appointed to the United States
Supreme Court; Justice Marshall was the first African American to be
appointed, and Justice Thomas was the second. SPANN, supra note 276, at 122.
292. See STONE ET AL., supra note 185, at 456-60.
293. By every virtually socioeconomic measure, African Americans remain
impoverished as relative to whites. As Hayman & Levit conclude:
America's white citizens average roughly twice the income of its black
citizens; its black citizens are unemployed at over twice the rate. Its
white citizens are more than twice as likely as its black citizens to live
in a family with an annual income in excess of $50,000; its black
citizens are roughly three times more likely to live in poverty. Its
white citizens have substantially lower mortality rates than its black
citizens; its black citizens are more likely to be murdered as young
adults.
Hayman & Levit, supra note 49, at 678-79 (footnotes omitted).
294. See Bonilla-Silva, supra note 76, at 86.
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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

A civil and human-rights vision for the twenty-first
century must be committed to the moral principle of social
justice.
Minority protection is an integral part of this
principle.295 If the current laws frustrate civil and human
rights by rationalizing social injustices, the law should be
transformed to address the plight of minority groups. On the
role of law in society, the position of faithful civil rights
advocates must be clear: the law must play a transformative
role, not a passive one. Where the political structure is
biased, it is the role of the judicial branch to maximize the
transformative capacity of the law.
The American experience further teaches us that to
transform the real-life conditions of deprived minorities in
democratic, deeply divided societies, it is insufficient to adopt
a general norm of formal equality. Majority privileges are
deeply ingrained in the current hierarchical structure of
society, and introducing a mere legal norm of equality, though
an important end by itself, falls short of changing this
structure. It is most likely that formal equality would leave
this hierarchical structure intact, and thereby perpetuate the
societal injustices inherent in it.
Yet, there is an alternative option that must be
considered if justice is to be sought: it must adopt a full,
transformative, group-based approach to equality that can
relate equally to the collective experiences of each group.
Only this transformative approach would identify and deconstruct built-in social injustices.

295. See generally EDELMAN, supra note 165, at 177-82; Peter Edelman,
Responding to the Wake- Up Call: A New Agenda for Poverty Lawyers, 24 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 547 (1998).

